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Abstract
Under moral hazard most insurance contracts condition the coverage neither
on the contingencies under which policyholders have chosen their unobserved
behavior, nor on the concrete features of the event that generated the damages.
This incompleteness can be explained by underwriting and auditing costs borne
by insurers, by policyholders’ cognitive costs, and by the limits of market reg-
ulation. It opens the door to controversies and disputes between insured and
insurer. In this context, we analyze how insurance law can mitigate moral haz-
ard by allowing insurers to reduce or cancel indemnities in some circumstances,
while preventing them from excessive nitpicking. We also highlight conditions
under which the burden of proof should be on the policyholders, provided that
insurers are threatened with bad faith penalties.
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1 Introduction
Rightly or wrongly, policyholders frequently think that insurers have leeway in settling
claims and that they nitpick on the indemnity payment if they believe it possible.
This is particularly true for risk categories where insurance contracts and the soft-law
guidelines provided by market regulators do not specify the coverage unambiguously in
all possible contingencies. As a result, the insurer is perceived as having a propensity to
challenge the legitimacy of claims by invoking provisions or the practices of insurance
law.
From a risk-sharing standpoint, this unpredictability of coverage weakens the ef-
ficiency of insurance contracting.1 On the other hand, conditioning coverage on the
circumstances of the loss may be worthwhile under moral hazard if circumstances
are informative concerning the policyholder’s effort (Holmstro¨m, 1979; Shavell, 1979).
However, in practice, the link between the circumstances of the claim and the indem-
nity is rarely specified in detail in the insurance contract, and it is often limited to
exclusions or force majeure clauses.2 In other words, more often than not, insurance
contracts are incomplete, and the resulting ambiguity may introduce a conflicted di-
mension into the insurer-insured relationship.3
This incompleteness can be attributed to the insurer’s underwriting cost and to the
1The efficiency loss due to the unpredictability of insurance coverage has been highlighted in the
literature on insurance contract non-performance, whose canonical formal set-up was introduced by
Doherty & Schlesinger (1990). Insurance non-performance occurs when the insurer is insolvent, but
also when he denies coverage in an abusive manner. See Harrison & Ng (2018) for a behavioral
evaluation of the welfare effects of non-performance risk.
2For instance, a corporate property policy may exclude the damage resulting from fire caused by
an explosion or from the transportation of hazardous materials. Likewise, an insurer may impose on
its customers the necessity to call on affiliated service providers (e.g., managed care networks), except
in the case of force majeure. However, insurance contracts rarely include conditional indemnities, i.e.
depending on all possible circumstances, such as, for instance, the precise weather conditions at the
origin of damages in the case of homeowner or automobile insurance, the number and quality (e.g.,
family or job-related connections) of witnesses, or the conditions when the policyholder is authorized
to involve emergency services.
3The incompleteness of insurance contracts is subject to much attention from lawyers, judges
and policymakers. As Abraham (1986) puts it: “Insurance policies often are not specific enough to
make the rights and obligations of the parties during the claims process crystal clear”. It has also been
recognized that the sequential nature of the insurer-insured relationship (meaning that the insured has
to pay the premium before coverage starts) puts policyholders in a position of inferiority, and may favor
insurers’ opportunism. In this regard, Works (1998) draws a parallel with the conditions identified by
Williamson (1985), i.e. bounded rationality and asset specificity, under which opportunism is likely
to thrive. He highlights how insurance law should limit the “forfeiture risk”, i.e. the propensity of
insurers to unduly deny coverage, by interpreting to their advantage the contractual conditions that
trigger the payment of the insurance indemnity. This reinforces the importance of dispute resolution
mechanisms in insurance law and regulation, including litigation, and, more often, arbitration, state-
sponsored complaint-conciliation programs, and private ombudsmen schemes (see Schwarcz, 2008).
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policyholder’s cognitive cost,4 both of them being prohibitive in the case of complete
contracts. Furthermore, the operative event at the origin of the loss is frequently private
information of the claimant, and exhaustively verifying the claim circumstances may
be too costly. Observing the detailed circumstances of a loss requires a costly state
verification process, and, most of the time, such an audit is justified only when the
insurer has reason to believe that the policyholder misbehaved in some way. However,
the incompleteness of insurance contracts does not necessarily break the link between
the indemnity paid to the claimant and the circumstances of the loss. In particular,
the insurer may invoke legal means to deny coverage by elaborating on the evidence
obtained by auditing the claim, which may be contested in court by the claimant.
Alleging some misconduct by the policyholder then appears as an indirect way to
condition the insurance coverage on the circumstances of the loss, provided, of course,
that the judge agrees with the insurer.
The concern about moral hazard holds a significant place in the law of insurance
contracts. It is viewed by law makers and judges as a situation where the policy-
holder’s negligence or more severe misconducts breach the probabilistic link between a
peril faced by the policyholder under normal behavior (e.g., “reasonable care” in the
case of property insurance) and operative events leading to losses. Beyond contractual
stipulations aiming at curving moral hazard (e.g., deductible, co-payment or expe-
rience rating), this breach requires that negligence, deliberate recklessness or willful
misconducts are, in legal terms, subject to “contract exception.” In other words, they
are considered as reasons for which the compensation may be reduced or refused, on
grounds of the insured’s behavior alleged by the insurer. In the light of the circum-
stances of the event, the judge - if the case ends up in the courts - has to decide whether
such an exception applies. This goes through a case by case approach, in which the
circumstances of the loss are examined and the judge has to decide whether or not,
on the balance of probabilities, the allegedly inadequate behavior of the policyholder
motivates an exception for negligence.5
4For instance, Thaler & Sunstein (2009) and Handel & Kolstad (2015) present evidence that
choosing a health insurance plan is viewed as a complicated decision by individuals, and that their
choices are heavily influenced by factors such as context, switching costs, information frictions and
hassle costs.
5Under Common Law, exceptions of negligence have been construed rather restrictively, with the
objective of not constituting legal obstacles to the development of insurance markets, particularly
through opportunistic insurers’ behaviors. In the history of insurance law, this restrictive approach
is associated with Lord Diplock, from the name of the member of the House of Lords who delivered
the judgment in Fraser vs Furman Ltd (1967), in which this principle was stated (see Clarke, 1997,
section 19.2).
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Insurance lines Misconducts Legal means
Health, life or credit insur-
ance
Misrepresenting pre-existing
heath conditions.
Misrepresentation
Non-disclosing previous health
events, hiding smoker status.
Non-disclosure
Homeowner insurance Not taking maintenance measures
if a major storm is announced.
Duty of care
Theft insurance Non revealing valuables that
could be stolen.
Non-disclosure
Undervaluing an asset. Misrepresentation
Automobile insurance Driving on worn tires. Duty of care
Driving under the influence of al-
cohol.
Reckless conduct
D&O liability insurance Lack of supervision by corporate
board.
Duty of care
Financial statement falsification. Misrepresentation
Table 1: Examples of misconducts and legal means.
In the practice of insurance law, there are a number of legal means that can be
invoked by insurers, either before a court or in an out-of-court settlement, to motivate
a decrease in indemnity or to back the pure and simple denial of the claim. They are
a great many misconducts that may occur, potentially related to a small number of
specific legal means, with combinations and variable intensities in the application of
each of them. Table 1 provides a few examples of such a correspondence. Legal means,
like “duty of care” or “reckless conduct”, are directly related to willful actions at the
origin of the insured’s loss. Means like “misrepresentation” or “non-disclosure” may
be used when the policyholder has deliberately falsified his/her risk exposure, hence
hiding his actual behavior and contradicting the principle of “utmost good faith” which
is at the heart of insurance law.
In a case such as automobile insurance, the operative events leading to losses are
usually well documented through friendly reports, complemented by expert and police
reports when necessary, and insurance by-laws assign responsibilities to the parties
without much ambiguity. Furthermore, available information repeatedly accumulated
by insurers allows them to offer sophisticated contracts, including provisions such as
pay-as-you-drive and experience-rating, that contribute to reduce the intensity of moral
hazard. This will be reinforced by the sharp development of telematics allowing insurers
(or firms in the case of fleet insurance) to closely monitor the behavior of drivers. This
is expected to reduce even more the moral hazard problem. However, for many other
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property-casualty and liability insurance risks, the circumstances of the losses are much
less objectified and transparent, and conflicts of interpretation abound, with insurance
law as a last resort.
As a typical example of how contract law interferes with the settlement of insur-
ance claims under moral hazard, consider the case of Directors and Officers liability
insurance (D&O). The question as to whether D&O insurance weakens the deterrence
role of security law protecting minority shareholders has been extensively studied. Al-
though such analyses are made difficult by the lack of data transparency, there is some
evidence that D&O insurance creates corporate moral hazard through misconducts of
managers and directors.6 Insurers try to reduce this moral hazard by limiting their
coverage through deductibles, coinsurance and upper limits. However, the incentive
effects of such provisions remain obviously limited, and relying on insurance law is of-
ten the only solution available to insurers. In this respect, the Enron bankruptcy is an
almost caricatural textbook case. In November 2001, Enron recognized that its finan-
cial statements for 1997 through the first half of 2001, included in its SEC filings, were
wrong and would have to be restated. Following this announcement, several of Enron’s
D&O insurers, and first of all AEGIS, its Bermuda mutual insurer, filed motions with
the Bankruptcy Court asserting that, because of such a material misrepresentation,
they were not bound by their policies and no indemnity should be paid. Enron, World-
Com, and many other minor cases have been at the origin of endless debates before
the courts, in which the good or bad faith of directors was a crucial element for courts
to decide whether D&O insurance contracts were fully or partially rescinded, hereby
inducing dramatic consequences for managers and directors accused of wrongdoings.
In cases that set precedent in several jurisdictions, the courts approved the insurer’s
indemnity denial by referring to the moral hazard problem, for the first time advocated
in explicit terms by Judge Richard Posner.7 The courts tend to approve the denial
of coverage when the insured did not comply with pre-existing obligations (such as
claims for unpaid wages to workers or benefits to pensioners), when he/she gained a
personal profit or other advantage to which he/she was not legally entitled, or in the
case of the breach of a written contract by the insured,8 to name but a few examples
6See Ambrose et al. (2013) for a survey. See Baker & Griffith (2006) and Zou et al. (2008) on
publicly traded firms in the US and in China, respectively.
7Posner’s moral hazard argument was stated in May Department Stores Co. vs Federal Insurance
Co (2002).
8As explained by Judge Posner in the decision about Krueger International Inc vs Royal Indemnity
Co. (2007), “Moral hazard provides a further explanation for the distinction that the policy makes
between written and oral contracts. The breach of a written contract will often be a deliberate act by
the insured, while the breach of a contract created by an oral representation of an employee is likely
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of loss circumstances affecting the court decisions. Most of the time, the question is
whether the complaint from shareholders, workers or customers results from errors or
occasional carelessness inherent within the framework of business life or from the willful
misconduct of D&Os.
In what follows, we will investigate the issue of moral hazard under incomplete
insurance contracts from a theoretical standpoint. To do so, we will be considering a
setting where the insurer observes neither the action taken by the policyholder (as in
usual moral hazard problems), nor the concrete contingencies she faced at that time,
and that conditioned her behavior. This takes us away from a first-best world where,
in the absence of transaction cost, risk-averse policyholders should transfer their risk
exposure entirely to risk-neutral insurers. The variety of situations leads to a variety
of behaviors among the population of policyholders. If a loss occurs, the insured files
a claim that provides some partial information on the circumstances of the loss. In a
second-best world with moral hazard, where the only asymmetry of information con-
cerns the policyholder’s behavior, the optimal contract should condition the coverage
on the state faced by the policyholder, and on the circumstances of the loss. However,
although force majeure cases and some particular circumstances may be contractible,
this second-best setting is not very realistic for a general approach to insurance con-
tracting. In a third-best world, gathering evidence about the circumstances of the loss
is costly and, furthermore, the insurer cannot know the contingencies that conditioned
the policyholder’s behavior. Hence, contracts are incomplete, i.e. it is impossible to
spell out the relationship between the indemnity reduction and the many states and
circumstances of loss. In this third-best setting, the insurer may decide to audit a claim
in order to obtain evidence on the circumstances of the loss, and possibly to allege that
the policyholder misbehaved in some way. Such allegations may be contested by pol-
icyholders, and the law of insurance contracts will be the final arbiter of conflicts. In
the case of judicial recourse, we assume that the judge has perfect knowledge of the
distribution of the insured behaviors in the population, and that his decision is made
according to the “balance of probabilities” or to a higher standard of proof.9 This
corresponds to a judicial system that allows insurers to reduce or cancel indemnities
to be, from the insured’s standpoint, an unavoidable accident. The difference lies in the nature of
the act that precipitates the breach: a deliberate decision by the insured, on the one hand, and the
careless or unauthorized act of an employee on the other.”
9In Common Law, proof based on the balance of probabilities is the standard in use in cases of civil
suits, while proof beyond reasonable doubt is adopted in criminal cases. Demougin & Fluet (2006)
show that the balance of probabilities decision rule provides maximal incentives to exert care. See
also Demougin & Fluet (2008) for an analysis of the case of imperfect evidence.
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in circumstances that are likely to reveal severe misconduct by the policyholder. This
leeway provided by the law leads the insurer to indirectly condition coverage on the
circumstances of the loss, which is a desirable feature of the contract but cannot be
written into contractual clauses. We will also consider the particular case of a “stan-
dard of negligence” whereby the insurer is allowed to fully deny the coverage above a
negligence threshold, and has to pay the contractual indemnity otherwise, the judge’s
approval being based on a standard of proof.
Finally, we will investigate the burden of proof issue, when the costs of providing
verifiable information (i.e. strong evidence that may be checked by a court) are at the
origin of an additional efficiency loss. We show that, in this fourth-best world, the
burden of proof should be on the policyholder if the cost of transmitting hard evidence
is not larger (or, at least, not much larger) for the policyholder than for the insurer.
Intuitively, attributing the burden of proof to the policyholder is a way of avoiding
the cost of transmitting hard evidence to the court, because the insurer has only to
allege misconduct that will not be contested at equilibrium. This result is robust to
the introduction of out-of-court-settlements, but it requires that the insurer faces a
bad faith penalty if he is contradicted by the judge. In other words, giving the burden
of proof to the policyholder and threatening insurers with bad faith penalties appear
to be the two arms of a balanced fourth-best solution.
Our analysis has many sources. The first is the wide literature on incentives with in-
complete contracts whose origin lies in the theory of the firm, when the state-contingent
sharing of surplus cannot be exhaustively described in contractual arrangements be-
tween stakeholders (see Hart & Moore, 1999). It is also related to the analysis of
conflicts in firms when labor contracts are incomplete because of the difficulty in gaug-
ing and verifying the many aspects of performance such as teamwork or initiative.10
Another approach to incomplete contracts focuses on the legal rules that restrict the
set of feasible contracts and constrain the process of adversarial litigation in contract
enforcement. This consists in analyzing incomplete contracts as agreements that do
not specify what should be done by the parties in some contingencies and that include
references to broad legal standards.11 Our approach is linked to this second trend by
considering a setting where insurers may refer to behavioral standards to deny claims,
and by focusing attention on how insurance law and adversarial litigation restrict their
10See MacLeod (2007), or Malcomson (2012), for an overview of the “relational contracts” literature.
11See for instance Shavell (1980) on damage measures for breach of contract, and Scott & Triantis
(2005), who challenge the stylized representation of legal enforcement in the concept of verifiability,
and advocate a more sophisticated understanding of litigation in the analysis of contract design. See
Spier (2007) for a survey of the academic literature on the economics of litigation.
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discretionary power. The analysis of the negligence rule by Fagart & Fluet (2009) is
illustrative of this approach in the case of liability insurance.12 A connection may also
be made with the analysis of insurance fraud by Bourgeon & Picard (2014): by allowing
insurers to reduce the indemnity according to the circumstances of the loss, insurance
law acts as an incentive device to perform costly audits. Burden of proof rules, which
require a specified party to produce evidence on a contested issue, are central to the
adversary system. We highlight conditions under which the burden of proof should be
on the policyholders, provided that insurers are threatened with bad faith penalties.
The rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces our insurance model
under moral hazard. Its main specificity, by comparison with more usual approaches,
is twofold. Firstly, we consider an environment where the policyholder may be in
various states when she chooses her behavior, resulting in a distribution of effort levels
among a population of identical policyholders. Secondly, claims are characterized by
the circumstances of the operative event (the accident) at the origin of the loss. In
this setting, we characterize the optimal (second-best) insurance contract in a moral
hazard setting, where the only asymmetry of information concerns the policyholder’s
behavior. In Section 3, we turn towards an incomplete (third-best) contract setting,
where verifying the circumstances of the loss requires a costly audit. We still consider in
this case that the state (i.e. the contingencies in which the policyholder has chosen her
behavior) remains unknown to the insurer. We analyze the post-claim insurer-insured
interaction in such a setting, with courts making decisions on the basis of a standard
of proof, such as the balance of probabilities. Section 4 focuses attention on simplified
cases, with only two or three types of behavior. This allows us to highlight the trade-off
between incentives through the rules of law and through partial insurance coverage.
Section 5 considers the case where auditing claims only provides soft information about
the circumstances of the loss, i.e. it only allows the insurer to take notice of these
circumstances. Providing hard evidence requires verifiable information that can be
transmitted to the court, either by the policyholder or by the insurer, with specific
additional costs. This leads us to a fourth-best optimal solution where the burden of
proof may be given either to the insurer or to the insured. Section 6 concludes. Proofs
are in an appendix.
12Fagart & Fluet (2009) consider a setting in which the level of care of a potential injurer is not
verifiable, a signal about this behavior being perceived following the occurrence of harm affecting a
victim. A non-contractible signal makes liability insurance contracts incomplete, but it nevertheless
provides some evidence to courts. This evidence can be compared to a standard in order to implement
the negligence rule, with a binary set of possible judicial decisions {liable, non-liable}. Fagart & Fluet
(2009) show that such an evidence-based negligence rule may Pareto dominate the strict liability rule.
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2 The model
2.1 Notations and basic assumptions
Consider a competitive insurance market where insurers provide coverage to risk-averse
individuals (households or firms) against accidents that may result in a loss L. The
occurrence of the loss depends on the policyholder’s behavior which is indexed by
b ∈ B ={1, 2, . . . , n} and ranks the probability of accident pib increasingly, i.e. pi1 <
pi2 < ... < pin. Hence, b = 1 corresponds to a cautious behavior with the lowest
probability of accident, and the other behaviors b ∈ {2, ..., n} refer to various types of
misconduct, increasingly risky, but also decreasingly demanding in terms of effort. The
disutility of each behavior b is, however, imperfectly known to the policyholder at the
time she takes out the insurance policy: it depends on a parameter θ that reflects the
diversity of concrete situations in which she may find herself during the policy period,
which we refer to as the “state”, when she chooses her behavior. We assume θ ∈ Θ,
where Θ is the (finite or infinite) set of possible states, and the disutility of behavior b
in state θ is denoted db(θ), with db(θ) > db+1(θ), for all b ∈ B and all θ ∈ Θ. Hence, in
all states, less risky behaviors entail a larger disutility because they require more effort
on the part of the policyholder.13
By way of illustration, consider the case of D&O insurance. Here, behaviors b =
1, . . . , n correspond to all the possible ways through which corporate directors and
officers may manage the firm they are in charge of, paying more or less attention
to the legitimate interest of stockholders, customers and other stakeholders. A loss
occurs (most often after a class action) when directors or managers are held liable by
a court for compensating stakeholders for their loss. In this case, θ ∈ Θ corresponds to
all the relevant facts that have influenced the management and are unknown ex ante
(i.e. occurring after the conclusion of the insurance contract). This refers to business
situations that affect the behavior of directors and officers during the validity period
of the insurance coverage.14,15
13Assuming db(θ) > db+1(θ) is not restrictive because the policyholder would prefer b to b + 1 in
state θ if db(θ) ≤ db+1(θ) and pib < pib+1. In other words, behavior b+ 1 would not be chosen in state
θ.
14The agency approach to corporate finance emphasizes the endogeneity of management decisions,
such as engaging in too risky projects, or giving undue preference to particular suppliers or subcon-
tractors. Such misconducts may lead to lower expected profit and ultimately to financial distress,
affecting shareholders and possibly employees of the firm. In addition to managers’ moral standard,
the possibility to earn such private benefits results from fluctuating business uncertainties, e.g., avail-
able free cash flows masking perks and privileges, or opportunities to contract with inefficient suppliers
or subcontractors offering future job opportunities.
15Another illustration is given by the case of car insurance. A car driver may exert a low level of
9
We assume that θ is distributed in Θ according to a probability measure H(θ).16 If
the policyholder chooses behavior b in state θ, then her utility is u(Wf )− db(θ) where
Wf is her final wealth and u is a (twice continuously differentiable) von Neumann-
Morgenstern utility function such that u′ > 0 and u′′ < 0. The insurer may collect
evidence concerning the circumstances of the accident, which leads to an index x ∈ (0, 1]
that reflects the more or less risky behavior of the policyholder, and x = 0 when there
is no claim. Again, using D&O insurance as an example, this index would convey
the informational value of the circumstances (such as undue personal profit or non-
compliance with written injunctions) suggesting that the loss is likely to have resulted
from a deliberate misbehavior of the insured, rather than from the intrinsic uncertainty
of business life.
Index x is distributed in [0, 1] according to c.d.f. Gb(x) where b ∈ B is the poli-
cyholder’s behavior, with x = 0 if there is no claim, and thus a mass of probability
Gb(0) = 1 − pib, and x > 0 in the case of an accident, with continuous derivative
gb(x) = G
′
b(x) if x ∈ (0, 1]. The p.d.f. and c.d.f. of x for behavior b conditionally on a
loss occurring are denoted gˆb(x) = gb(x)/pib and Gˆb(x) =
∫ x
0
gˆb(t)dt, respectively. We
assume that an increase in b induces a shift in the distribution of x, with strict MLRP
when a loss occurs, i.e. gˆb+1(x)/gˆb(x) is increasing with respect to x in (0, 1] for all
b ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1}. In words, a large x leads one to think that the policyholder was
at fault for severe misconduct.17,18 By an abuse of language, in what follows we may
effort because she does not adequately maintain her vehicle, or because her speed is not appropriate, or
because she drives after drinking, or because of a mixture of these behaviors. All possible misconducts
correspond to b ∈ {2, ..., n}. θ may be viewed as a random shock that affects the driver’s disutility
of refraining from these various misconducts. For example, vehicle maintenance will be more painful
to the owner when she is struggling to make ends meet in unexpected tough economic circumstances.
Likewise, a driver may think that it is not so bad to break the speed limit if he has to arrive on time
at an important business meeting.
16We do not make any particular assumption on H(θ). We may assume, for instance, that it
corresponds to a density h(θ). In Section 4, we consider the case where Θ includes a finite number of
states.
17We may be more explicit, and denote by ω ∈ Ω, the operative event at the origin of the loss,
where Ω is the set of all possible events (i.e. all types of accident that may occur). Let (Ω,F ,Pb) be a
probability space, with a probability measure Pb for each policyholder’s behavior b ∈ B. We know from
Milgrom (1981) that we can associate a real variable x to event ω through a function x = ϕ(ω), with
ϕ : Ω −→ [0, 1], such that x is a sufficient statistic for b and satisfies MLRP for all b. In particular,
for any non-degenerate prior on b, an increase in x induces a FOSD shift in the posterior probability
distribution of b. In this sense, a large x can be interpreted as a “bad news”, i.e. as suggesting that
the policyholder is guilty of serious misconduct.
18Since MLRP implies FOSD, we have Gˆb+1(x) < Gˆb(x) for all x in (0, 1). As Gb(x) = 1− pib[1−
Gˆb(x)] and pib+1 > pib, we also have Gb+1(x) < Gb(x) for all x in [0, 1). To simplify matters (and to
avoid corner solutions), we also assume gˆb(x)/gˆ1(x) → 0 when x → 0 and gˆb(x)/gˆ1(x) → ∞ when
x→ 1 if b > 1. Intuitively, b = 1 is much more likely than b > 1 when x is close to 0, and conversely
when x is close to 1.
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refer to x as the circumstances of the loss, although this is only the suspicion index
derived from them. To summarize, state θ refers to everything that conditions the pol-
icyholder’s decision-making about her behavior b, while circumstances x characterize
the operative event at the origin of the financial loss L.
An insurance contract specifies a premium P paid at the outset, and a non-negative
indemnity I in the case of a loss. We denote b?(·) : Θ → B the policyholder’s “be-
havioral rule”, i.e. b?(θ) is the action taken by the insured in state θ ∈ Θ.19 We
neglect any transaction cost, and assume that insurers are risk neutral. Hence, the in-
surer’s break-even constraint imposes that the insurance premium covers the expected
indemnity payments. We also assume that over-insurance is ruled out, either for legal
reasons, or because the policyholder could deliberately create losses in order to pocket
the insurance indemnity. Under competitive forces, an equilibrium insurance contract
maximizes the individual’s expected utility (i.e. her expected utility before she knows
the state θ in which she will find herself) under the insurer’s break-even constraint, the
no-overinsurance constraint and the non-negative indemnity constraint.
In such a setting, a first-best allocation corresponds to the case where there is no
asymmetry of information of any kind between insurer and insured. In particular, the
insurer observes the state θ and the policyholder’s behavior b, and this information is
verifiable by a third party, like a court. It is well-known that such a first-best allocation
is characterized by full coverage I = L whatever the state θ and the circumstances of
the loss x.
2.2 Second-best contract under moral hazard
A second-best solution to the optimal insurance contracting problem corresponds to
the case where the insurer does not observe the policyholder’s behavior b, which is thus
private information to the policyholder, but there is no other asymmetry of information
between insured and insurer. In particular, they both observe the state θ and the
circumstances x of any accident which may occur. This information (θ, x) is costlessly
verifiable and may be used to condition the insurance coverage. Let I(θ, x) denote the
insurance indemnity. The policyholder’s final wealth is Wf = W − P if there is no
accident, and Wf = W −P −L+I(θ, x) when an accident with circumstances x occurs
in state θ. Thus, conditionally on state θ ∈ Θ, the expected utility of a policyholder
19In particular, an insurance policy inducing a behavior b?(θ) = 1 for all θ is usually suboptimal
because d1(θ) may be very large in some states θ. In what follows, we just consider behavioral rules
for which b?(θ) = 1 in a positive-measure subset of Θ.
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with behavior b ∈ B is written as ub(θ)− db(θ), where
ub(θ) = (1− pib)u(W − P ) + pib
∫ 1
0+
u(W − P − L+ I(θ, x))gˆb(x)dx. (1)
The first and second terms in (1) correspond to the no-accident and accident states
respectively. If the insurance contract induces behavior b?(θ) in state θ, then the ex
ante expected utility of the policyholder (when she signs the contract) and her ex post
incentive constraints (once she has learned about the relevant θ) are written as
Eu? ≡
∫
Θ
[ub?(θ)(θ)− db?(θ)(θ)]dH(θ), (2)
and
ub?(θ)(θ)− db?(θ)(θ) ≥ ub(θ)− db(θ) for all (θ, b) ∈ Θ× B, (3)
respectively. The insurer’s break-even constraint, and the no-overinsurance and non-
negativity constraints are written as
P ≥
∫
Θ
pib?(θ)
∫ 1
0+
I(θ, x)gˆb?(θ)(x)dxdH(θ), (4)
and
0 ≤ I(θ, x) ≤ L for all (θ, x) ∈ Θ× (0, 1], (5)
respectively.
The optimal insurance contract maximizes the expected utility given by (2) with
respect to P, I(·) and b?(·) subject to (3),(4) and (5).
Unsurprisingly, as shown in Proposition 1, I?(θ, x) actually depends on θ and x.
Indeed, for a given behavioral rule b?(·), the uncertainty about θ should be taken into
account in the insurance coverage. Furthermore, x is informative about the policy-
holder’s effort in the sense of Holmstro¨m (1979) and, in our moral hazard context, it
should condition the transfer from insurer to policyholder. Proposition 1 shows how
this conditioning should be implemented.
Proposition 1 For all θ ∈ Θ such that b?(θ) < n, there exist x(θ), x¯(θ) ∈ [0, 1] with
x(θ) < x¯(θ), such that the second-best optimal indemnity schedule I?(θ, x) is continuous
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in x, with
I?(θ, x) = L if 0 < x < x(θ) & x(θ) > 0,
0 < I?(θ, x) < L
dI?(θ, x)/dx < 0
}
if x(θ) < x < x¯(θ),
I?(θ, x) = 0 if x¯(θ) < x ≤ 1 & x¯(θ) < 1.
If b?(θ) = n, then dI?(θ, x)/dx = 0 for all x.
In all states θ where some effort is required (i.e. b?(θ) < n), the optimal insurance
policy provides either full coverage, partial coverage or zero coverage, depending on
the circumstances of the loss. The more favorable the circumstances (i.e. the lower
x), the larger the indemnity. The bounds L and 0 may be reached under the most
favorable or worst possible circumstances (i.e. when 0 < x ≤ x(θ) and x¯(θ) ≤ x ≤ 1),
respectively. There is partial coverage in the intermediary cases, with larger coverage
when circumstances are more favorable. Equivalently, we may write I?(θ, x) = [1 −
z?(θ, x)]L, where z?(θ, x) is an indemnity reduction such that z?(θ, x) = 0 if x < x(θ),
z?(θ, x) ∈ (0, 1) if x(θ) < x < x¯(θ) and z?(θ, x) = 1 if x > x¯(θ). These results are
illustrated in Figure 1.
6
-
I(θ, x)
1x¯(θ)x(θ)0
L
x
Figure 1: Optimal second-best indemnity
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3 Incomplete contracts
Aside from exceptional cases (e.g., a well-documented natural disaster being at the
origin of force majeure), the state θ in which policyholders find themselves is not
observed by insurers, and verifying it by audit would be very difficult, and even im-
possible in many cases. As regards the circumstances of the loss x, there are at least
two reasons for which, in practice, they may condition the insurance coverage only in
a very rudimentary way, particularly though exclusions for specific types of accident.
Firstly, obtaining verifiable information about the circumstances of an accident usually
requires a costly verification process. More often than not, claim handlers routinely
pay the insurance indemnity, but sometimes a (privately perceived) signal convinces
the insurer that the claim should be audited in order to know more about the circum-
stances surrounding it. Another reason is related to the cognitive costs of contracts. It
is true that insurance policies frequently contain a lot of small print, but, apart from
exclusion clauses, they mainly focus either on the legal principles governing insurance
contracts, or on policyholders’ duties.20 In fact, property and liability losses may occur
through operative events that correspond to such a large number of circumstances that
listing and describing them all, with specific coverage in all cases, would be unfeasible
in practice.21
Hence, in most cases, contractual insurance payments are neither conditioned upon
the ex ante situation of the policyholders nor on the ex post circumstances of the loss,
although such circumstances may nevertheless be verified by audit. It remains no less
true that the insurer may use the evidence yielded by audits to justify a more or less
severe reduction in the indemnity. Indeed, even if competition between the insurance
companies leads them to offer contracts that maximize the policyholder surplus ex
ante, they are also tempted to behave opportunistically ex post, i.e. to deny coverage
once the consumer is locked in. Hence, auditing the claim may be the starting point of
disputes between insurer and insured that are resolved through some legal arrangement,
be it an amicable settlement, by resorting to an arbitrator or by going to court.
We consider in the following that the resolution of conflicts between the parties is
left to the judge and that law-makers design the insurance law (i.e. the legal means
through which the insurer may challenge the legitimacy of a claim) in order to maximize
20For instance, calling for the service of affiliated car repairers or health care providers.
21Put differently, by using the terminology of cognitive science, complete contracts would induce
such a large cognitive load (i.e. too much effort in using working memory) that their incentive
advantages would not be worth it.
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the social welfare.22 Put differently, we analyze the outcome of competitive forces in the
insurance industry when the enforcement of incomplete insurance policies is governed
by legal principles stated by benevolent law-makers. As the auditing cost coupled
with the incompleteness of insurance policies are at the origin of an efficiency loss by
comparison with the second-best solution, the resulting allocations correspond to the
third-best solution to the insurance problem under moral hazard.
A standard way in the analysis of conflicts arbitrated by law consists in assuming
that judges decide by relying on the likelihood of the behavior alleged by each party.
An insurer may allege that the policyholder misbehaved and thus, on the basis of the
law of contracts, that the claim should be fully or partially denied. However, the
insurer’s allegations must be consistent with the empirical evidence provided by the
circumstances of losses, for otherwise the judge would consider them to be bad faith on
the part of the insurer and they would be invalidated. This consistency requirement
corresponds to a standard of proof, such as the balance of probabilities, that is used
for civil cases in Common Law.
Assume that, when a claim is filed, the insurer privately observes a signal s ∈ R
defined by
s = x+ ε,
where ε is a zero-mean random variable with density f(ε) defined over R and such
that Cov(x, ε) = 0. We assume that x can be verified by auditing the claim, which
costs c to the insurer, and we denote q(s) ∈ [0, 1] the audit probability when signal s
is perceived.
When no audit is performed, the insurer routinely pays I to the claimant, in which
case we have Wf = W − P − L + I. If x has been verified through an audit, then
the insurance payment depends on x through legal means that may be invoked by
the insurer.23 For notational simplicity we will not distinguish alleged misconduct
b ∈ {2, . . . , n} from the corresponding legal means (or broad standards) that can be
invoked by insurers, although, as we have noted above, in practice there are many types
of misconduct, while the law of insurance contracts only includes a limited number of
legal means. Insurance law specifies the insurer’s leeway in the claim settlement process,
i.e. to what extent a legal means allows him to reduce or even cancel coverage. More
22Similar results are obtained assuming state-sponsored or private conciliation institutions, as long
as they can commit on a pre-announced standard of proof and on guiding principles that apply
unambiguously to insureds and insurers.
23In what follows, we assume that the policyholder is informed that her claim is audited. This
is a plausible assumption since auditing usually requires additional information obtained from the
claimant or witnesses, or other stakeholders.
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precisely, in what follows, the law of insurance contracts is subsumed in the proportion
yb ∈ [0, 1] of the contractual indemnity that the insurer is allowed to reduce for each
behavior b. When the insurer is allowed to fully cancel the claim, we have yb = 1. We
assume y1 = 0 because the insurer can reduce the indemnity only by alleging that the
policyholder misbehaved in some way, and that the law is constrained by a severity
principle, according to which the severity of misconducts and the intensity of indemnity
reductions are co-monotone, i.e. yb ≤ yb+1 for all b = 1, . . . , n− 1. If the insurer is in a
position to invoke legal means b under circumstances x, then he may decide to reduce
the indemnity by a fraction z(x) lower or equal to yb, and the insurance payment is
[1− z(x)]I, with Wf = W − P − L+ [1− z(x)]I.24
When policyholders follow the behavior rule b?(θ), Bayes Law provides the condi-
tional probability of a behavior b when signal x ∈ (0, 1] is observed after an audit. This
is written as
Pr(b|x) =
gb(x)
∫
Θ?b
dH(θ)∑
b′∈B gb′(x)
∫
Θ?
b′
dH(θ)
, (6)
where Θ?b ≡ {θ ∈ Θ|b?(θ) = b} is the set of states in which the policyholder chooses
b ∈ B.
The standard of proof in use is characterized by parameter α ∈ [1/2, 1). Given x,
misconduct b0 ∈ {2, . . . , n} is said to be “credibly alleged according to the standard
of proof α” if the probability that the policyholder had misconduct b0 or a worse
misconduct b ∈ {b0 + 1, . . . , n} is larger than α, i.e. if∑n
b=b0
Pr(b|x) > α. (7)
Allegation b0 is said to be “credible on a balance of probabilities” when α = 1/2, or
equivalently when ∑n
b=b0
Pr(b|x) >
∑b0−1
b=1
Pr(b|x),
In other words, under the balance of probabilities, it is more likely that the policyholder
had misconduct b0 or a worse misconduct b ∈ {b0 + 1, . . . , n} than a better behavior
b ∈ {1, . . . , b0 − 1}. In what follows, most of our results are robust to changes in the
standard of proof, and parameter α ∈ [1/2, 1) is considered as given, without further
specification.25
24Since our perspective is predominantly normative, we do not restrict the set of indemnity reduc-
tions that courts could enforce when misconduct b is credibly alleged. However, we will also consider
the case of the so-called “negligence rule” where yb is restricted to 0 or 1, according to whether the
policyholder meets some standard of care, or not.
25Case α = 1 is excluded because it would means that courts approve an allegation only when it can
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We denote bˆ(x) the most serious misconduct that can be credibly alleged when
signal x is perceived through an audit, i.e.∑n
b=bˆ(x)+1
Pr(b|x) ≤ α <
∑n
b=bˆ(x)
Pr(b|x), (8)
with bˆ(x) = 1 if no misconduct b0 ∈ {2, . . . , n} is credible. The following lemma is
based on the MLRP assumption and shows that a larger x allows the insurer to credibly
allege more serious misconducts.
Lemma 1 bˆ(·) : [0, 1]→ B is a left-continuous non-decreasing step function.
Lemma 1 allows us to write bˆ(x) = b if xb < x ≤ xb+1, b = 1, . . . ,m with m ≤ n, x1 =
0, xm + 1 = 1, and xb given by ∑n
b′=b
Pr(b′|xb) = α
for all b = 2, ...,m, where m is the most credible severe misconduct under the standard
of proof α, when x is close to 1. The corresponding maximum indemnity reductions
are given by ybˆ(x) as illustrated in Figure 2 (where m = 4).
For example, when an audit reveals x ∈ (x3, x4], the insurer is in a position to
credibly allege a misconduct b3 or worse, and law allows him to reduce the indemnity
by a fraction y3 without being challenged by a judge in the event of a court action by
the insured. The claim may be fully denied when x > x4.
26
The interactions between the judicial system (law-makers and judges), insurers and
insureds can then be described by the following 6-stage game:27
- Stage 0: Law-makers decide on {yb, b = 2, . . . , n}.
be confirmed with full certainty. This would require that the support of x in (0, 1] depends on behavior
b, an unnecessarily restrictive assumption. Proof “beyond reasonable doubt” would corresponds to α
close to 1.
26The thresholds x2, x3, . . . , xm depend on the standard of proof α and are associated with the
behavioral rule b?(·).
27For the sake of clarity, we distinguish law-makers who decide in which cases and to what extent
insurers are allowed to deny coverage, from judges who apply these law principles under a standard of
proof. Most importantly, we assume that law-makers are acting as a social planner: they choose the
law principles in order to maximize the ex ante policyholders’ expected utility. Note that we consider
the standard of proof α as exogenously given, since, in practice, the same standard of proof is applied
to a wide class of law suits, like the balance of probabilities for civil cases under Common Law.
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Figure 2: Signal thresholds and indemnity reductions.
- Stage 1: Each insurer offers an insurance contract (I, P ).
- Stage 2: Each individual takes out her preferred insurance policy among the offers,
and nature choose θ for each policyholder. The policyholder observes θ and then
chooses behavior b ∈ B. Should a loss occur, she observes its circumstances x
and files a claim. In that case, the insurer observes signal s.
- Stage 3: If a claim has been filed, the insurer either pays I or triggers an audit. In
that case, he incurs the audit cost c and he obtains the verifiable information x.
The policyholder observes whether her claim is audited or not.
- Stage 4: If an audit has been performed, the insurer either pays I to the claimant,
or he alleges that the policyholder misbehaved according to b ∈ {2, . . . , n}.
- Stage 5: The policyholder may contest the insurer’s allegation in court. The judge
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confirms the insurer’s allegation if b ≤ bˆ(x), and dismisses it otherwise.
- Stage 6: The indemnity paid to the policyholder is I if the insurer’s allegation b has
been dismissed by the judge. Otherwise, the insurer pays an indemnity (1− z)I,
with z ≤ yb.
A subgame perfect equilibrium of this game is easily characterized. After observing
s at stage 2, the insurer triggers an audit at stage 3 if c ≤ E[ybˆ(x)|s]I, since b = bˆ(x)
is the most severe allegation made at stage 4 that will not be dismissed by the judge
at stage 5, and the insurer chooses z = ybˆ(x) at stage 6. Thus, an equilibrium audit
strategy is defined by
q(s) =
{
1 if c ≤ E[ybˆ(x)|s]I,
0 otherwise.
(9)
Lemma 2 When f(ε) is log-concave, the equilibrium audit strategy is a unit step func-
tion: q(s) = 0 if s < s? and q(s) = 1 if s ≥ s?, with s? ∈ R ∪ {−∞,+∞}.
The intuition of lemma 2 is straightforward. Its proof goes through preliminary
Lemma 3 in the Appendix C, showing that under log-concavity of f(ε) an increase in
s induces a FOSD shift in the conditional probability distribution of x. It is worth
auditing a claim when the signal s is bad enough to be considered to be a red flag,
indicating that the circumstances of the loss are likely to be unfavorable (i.e. x is
probably large). Cases where s? = ±∞ correspond to corner solutions where claims
are never (resp. always) audited because c is very large (resp. very low). The rest of
the analysis is performed assuming that f(ε) is log-concave.28
Conditionally on state θ ∈ Θ, the expected utility of a policyholder with behavior
b ∈ B is written as ub − db(θ), where
ub = (1− pib)u(W − P ) + pib
∫ 1
0+
u(W − P − L+ I) (1− E[q(s)|x]) gˆb(x)dx
+ pib
∫ 1
0+
u(W − P − L+ (1− z(x))I)E[q(s)|x]gˆb(x)dx (10)
with E[q(s)|x] = ∫ +∞−∞ q(s)f(s− x)ds and
z(x) = ybˆ(x) (11)
28Log-concave densities are unimodal, with convex level sets and sub-exponential tails. Many uni-
variate random variables whose distributions are defined by densities are log-concave, including the
Normal, Laplace, Uniform, Gamma and Beta distributions.
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for all x. The first, second and third terms in (10) correspond to the no-accident state,
to the accident states without audit and to the accident states with audit, respectively.
Since law-makers are supposed to be benevolent (they aim at maximizing the ex-
ante expected utility of policyholders) and identical insurers interact in a competitive
market, the equilibrium values of insurance contract (P, I), audit strategy q(·), and
insurance law {yb, b ∈ B} jointly maximize
Eu? ≡
∫
Θ
[ub?(θ) − db?(θ)(θ)]dH(θ) (12)
subject to
P ≥
∫
Θ
pib?(θ)
{
I +
∫ 1
0+
(c− Iybˆ(x))E[q(s)|x]gˆb?(θ)(x)dx
}
dH(θ), (13)
ub?(θ) − db?(θ)(θ) ≥ ub − db(θ) for all (θ, b) ∈ Θ× B, (14)
q(s) =
{
1 if s ≥ s?
0 if s < s?
, (15)
where s? is given by
c = E[ybˆ(x)|s?]I, (16)
and bˆ(·) : [0, 1]→ B, b?(·) : Θ→ B satisfy conditions (6) and (8).
Notations can be recapped as follows: b?(θ) is the policyholder’s behavior in state
θ, bˆ(x) is the most severe policyholder’s misconduct that can be credibly alleged by
the insurer after observing circumstances x through a claim audit, and s? is the signal
threshold above which an audit is triggered. Hence, Eu? given by (12) is the ex ante
policyholder’s expected utility, i.e. before she knows the state θ, with behavioral rule
b?(·). Condition (15) is deduced from condition (9) and Lemma 2: an audit is triggered
if s ≥ s?, where s? is given by (16).29 Auditing a claim costs c, but it allows the insurer
to reduce the indemnity from I to I[1− ybˆ(x)] if the audit reveals claim circumstances
x. Hence, (13) is the insurer’s break-even condition. (14) is the ex post incentive
constraint: in state θ, the policyholder weakly prefers behavior b?(θ), rather than any
other behavior b 6= b?(θ).30,31
29Eq. (16) assumes that s? 6= ±∞. It can be easily extended to these cases.
30In what follows, in order to avoid corner solutions where the insured would always choose the best
or worst behavior, we assume that the no-audit optimal strategy b?na(θ) —i.e. the optimal solution
under z(x) = 0 for all x— is such that 1 < b?na(θ) < n in a positive-measure subset of Θ. We also
assume that I > 0 at such a no-audit solution.
31At a third-best optimal solution, policyholders may not choose their most efficient behavior (i.e.
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Proposition 2 If c is not prohibitively large, then an optimal third-best solution to the
insurance moral hazard problem is such that yb > 0 in a non-empty subset of B and the
insurer audits claims with positive probability (i.e. s? < +∞).
In short, when court decisions are based on a standard of proof α ∈ [1/2, 1), au-
diting claims puts the insurer in the position to credibly allege that the policyholder
misbehaved in some way when x is sufficiently large, i.e. when bˆ(x) ≥ 2. The insurer
will not be dismissed by the court and, in such cases, insurance law should allow him to
reduce or cancel indemnities. It is worth auditing when the expected claim reduction
E[ybˆ(x)|s]I is larger than the audit cost c, which holds when s ≥ s?, with s? < +∞ if
c is not too large. This leeway provided by law leads the insurer to condition the pay-
ment on the circumstances of the loss, which is a desirable feature of the relationship
between insurer and insured, although it is not written in contractual clauses. From
this standpoint, the variability of coverage should not be viewed as reflecting the op-
portunistic behavior of insurers (as often suggested by the bad reputations of nitpicky
insurers), but as the outcome of law provisions improving the efficiency of insurance
mechanisms under moral hazard when contracts are incomplete.
Proposition 2 is established without preconditions on the proportions y2, . . . , yn,
apart from the fact that they are non-decreasing. Additional constraints may be im-
posed by more specific rules of law. This is the case of the “negligence rule” which
play an important role in liability law, when acceptable standards of safe conduct can
be defined and applied to a variety of settings. In our framework, the negligence rule
is defined by a “standard of care” b¯: the insurer is allowed to fully cancel the coverage
if he can credibly allege (under the current standard of proof) that the insured misbe-
haved by choosing b > b¯, or equivalently that her accident probability was larger than
the lowest accident probability) among the behaviors that are equivalent to them. The reason for
this paradox is that the behavior rule b?(·) affects bˆ(·), and thus function z(·). The proofs show
that Propositions 2 and 3 remain valid if we postulate that policyholders always choose their lowest
accident probability among their optimal choices. More generally, the model could be extended to the
case where policyholders randomize among their best choices. This would reinforce the conclusions
of Propositions 2 and 3, because such mixed strategies are not optimal in the standard moral hazard
model without auditing. In an insightful remark, a referee observed that allowing for mixed-strategy
could be a way to extend our results to the case of a single type (i.e. Θ is a singleton). However,
assuming that players coordinate themselves to choose pure strategies with equilibrium probabilities
(each pure strategy being chosen by a fraction of agents), is a problem in its own right. Our approach
is in the spirit of the correlated equilibrium introduced by Aumann (1974, 1987) since the distribution
of pure equilibrium strategies results from signal θ acting as a strategy generator.
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pib¯, and he has to pay the full indemnity otherwise. Hence, the negligence rule gives
yb = 1 if b > b¯,
yb = 0 if b ≤ b¯.
It can be enforced by denying coverage under circumstances x > xb¯+1, where x1, x2, . . . , xm
denote the discontinuity points of function bˆ(x). In other words, xb¯+1 is the threshold
above which it can be credibly alleged that the insured’s behavior was b¯+ 1 or worse.
This gives z(x) = 0 if x ≤ xb¯+1 and z(x) = 1 if x > xb¯+1. In short, a negligence rule
restricts the stipulations of law to an all-or-nothing alternative, the enforcement of the
standard of care b¯ being constrained by the credibility constraint associated with the
standard of proof α.
Not surprisingly, this restriction weakens the effectiveness of legal mechanisms under
moral hazard, hence leading to a lower policyholder’s expected utility, for α unchanged.
The following proposition provides sufficient conditions for the negligence rule to be
nevertheless more efficient than the no-audit solution.
Proposition 3 Assume limx→1 gb+1(x)/gb(x)→ +∞ for all b ∈ {1, . . . , n−1} and c is
not prohibitively large. There exists a standard of care b¯ < n and a standard of proof α¯ ∈
[1/2, 1) such that, when α ≥ α¯, an optimal third-best solution to the insurance moral
hazard problem under the negligence rule dominates the no-audit optimal solution, with
positive probability of audit (i.e. s? < +∞).
The first assumption in Proposition 3 conveys the idea that the worst signals (i.e.
x close to 1) are very informative about the severity of misconducts. Intuitively, when
x tends to 1, any misconduct b + 1 becomes much more likely than b. Hence, starting
from the no-audit allocation, intuition suggests that an efficiency gain could be reached
by a negligence rule with standard of care b¯ < mna(α). Here, mna(α) is the most severe
misconduct in the optimal non-audit solution that can be credibly alleged under the
standard of proof α. However, in some cases, matters may be less simple than expected.
Consider the case where an important proportion of policyholders choose b = mna(α)
at the optimal no-audit solution. In that case, xmna(α) may be relatively small, i.e.
for many values of x, the insurer can credibly allege that the policyholder’s behavior
was b = mna(α) or worse. Hence, adopting the negligence rule b¯ = mna(α) − 1 may
be suboptimal because it would indifferently affect a large proportion of policyholders.
This argument is valid for a given standard of proof α ∈ [1/2, 1), and in particular
for the balance of probabilities criterion α = 1/2. Increasing the standard of proof
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α is a way to smooth the effect of the negligence rule when its effects are too harsh.
When α is raised, the thresholds xb increase and the possible negative effects of the
negligence rule are mitigated. Under this caveat of a sufficiently stringent standard
of proof, Proposition 3 shows that the negligence rule also induces an efficiency gain
by comparison with the no-audit solution, provided that signals are very informative
about the worst misconducts.
4 Illustrative examples
In this section, we assume a discrete distribution of states., i.e. Θ = {θ1, . . . , θn} with
probabilities hi = Pr{θ = θi} > 0,
∑n
i=1 hi = 1, and n = 2 or 3. We characterize the
optimal third-best insurance contract corresponding to separating allocations where
the policyholder chooses bi in state θi. We assume that the audit cost is negligible, i.e.
c = 0, but conclusions remain valid if c is not too large.
4.1 The two-state case
Assume B = {1, 2} and Θ = {θ1, θ2} with d1(θ1) > d2(θ1) > 0 and d1(θ2) = +∞, d2(θ2) ≥
0. In words, θ1 is a normal state, in which the policyholder can be incentivized in order
to choose b = 1, while she never chooses b = 1 when she is in state θ2. We consider an
optimal third-best allocation where the policyholder chooses b = 1 when θ = θ1, and
b = 2 when θ = θ2. The law of contracts allows the insurer to reduce the indemnity by a
proportion y2 when x ≥ x2 where the threshold x2 characterizes separating allocations
and is deduced from Pr(b = 2|x2) = α, i.e.
gˆ2(x2)
gˆ1(x2)
=
α
1− α
pi1h1
pi2h2
. (17)
Eq. (17) defines implicitly a threshold function x2(α) that increases with α from
x2(0) = 0 to x2(1) = 1. It is convenient to restate our problem in terms of utils rather
than monetary values. This is done by defining uˆ = u(W −P ), u0 = u(W −P −L+I),
u1 = u(W −P −L+ (1− y2)I), and v = u0−u1. Since the type-θ1 incentive constraint
is binding, it may be rewritten as
uˆ = u0 + A− v∆ (18)
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where ∆ = [G1(x2) − G2(x2)]/(pi2 − pi1) > 0 and A = [d1(θ1) − d2(θ1)]/(pi2 − pi1) > 0.
The insurer’s break-even constraint can be expressed as
W¯ ≥ u−1(u0)
∑
i=1,2
hipiiGˆi(x2) + u
−1(u0 − v)
∑
i=1,2
hipii(1− Gˆi(x2))
+
(
1−
∑
i=1,2
hipii
)
u−1(u0 + A− v∆)
≡ K1(u0, v), (19)
where W¯ = W − L∑i=1,2 hipii is the ex ante policyholder’s expected wealth. Since
u is concave, u−1 is convex and thus K1(u0, v) is a convex function of u0 and v, with
∂K1/∂u0 > 0 and ∂K1/∂v < 0. The same substitutions yield
Eu? =
∑
i=1,2
hi{(1− pii)(u0 + A− v∆) + pii[u0 − (1− Gˆi(x2))v]− di(θi)} (20)
using (18). Finally, the conditions y2 ≥ 0 and I ≤ L can be written as v ≥ 0 and
u0 ≤ uˆ, respectively. We thus must have32
0 ≤ v ≤ A/∆. (21)
Given a standard of proof α, the optimal solution is obtained by maximizing Eu?
given by (20) w.r.t. u0 and v, subject to (19) and (21). As illustrated in Figures 3
and 4, the insurer’s break-even constraint K1(u0, v) = W¯ corresponds to an increasing
convex locus in the (u0, v) plane. Iso-expected utility curves are increasing straight
lines. Point D1 corresponds to v = 0, hence y2 = 0: the insurer is not allowed to
cut the indemnity, and the optimal solution to the moral hazard problem only goes
through the deductible L − I. On the contrary, E1 corresponds to I = L and y2 > 0.
When moving from D1 to E1 on the insurer’s break-even locus, the legal penalty v is
progressively substituted to the deductible L− I, and the latter fully vanishes at point
E1. Figure 3 illustrates the case of a corner solution at point E1 where v = A/∆, and
thus with I = L. For a given standard of proof α, it is shown in the appendix that
this is the case when h2 is large enough. More explicitly:
Proposition 4 Assume n = 2. We have y2 > 0. Furthermore, there exists h
? ∈ (0, 1),
such that the optimal third-best contract provides full coverage (i.e. I = L) if h2 ≥ h?
and partial coverage (i.e. I < L) if h2 < h
?.
32We must also have y2 ≤ 1. Appendix F shows that this is the case if A is small enough.
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Eu? = cst
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D1t
K1(u0, v) = W¯
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Figure 3: Equilibrium contract when h2 > h
?.
The first part of Proposition 4 just rephrases Proposition 2 when n = 2, but with
a simple proof provided in appendix H. The following of Proposition 4 highlights the
trade-off between the incentives provided by the law of insurance contracts and those
provided by the indemnity schedule. Two regimes exist, according to whether h2 is
larger or smaller than the threshold h?.33 If many individuals exert the low effort level
(i.e. if h2 > h
?), it is optimal to offer an insurance contract with full coverage and
to allow the insurer to reduce or cancel the indemnity when the circumstances reveal
misconduct.34 On the contrary, if h2 < h
?, it is difficult for the insurer to credibly
claim that the insured did misbehave (i.e. this is possible only for very large x), and
incentives are better provided by offering a contractual indemnity that is lower than
the loss, whatever the circumstances. These two cases are illustrated by Figures 3 and
33h? depends on G1(·) and G2(·), i.e. on the probability distributions of the circumstances of a loss.
34The corner solution I = L illustrated in Figure 3 shows that I > L might be optimal if I were
not bounded to be in [0, L]. Intuitively, an increase in I discourages the policyholder to exert effort,
but it also increases the penalty y2I when x > x2, which incentivizes her to make more effort. This
makes an optimal solution with I > L possible.
25
4, respectively.
0 uˆ
u0
D1t
E1 t
t
v
A/∆
Eu∗ = cst
K1(u0, v) = W¯






-
6
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
@@R
@@R
@@R
Figure 4: Equilibrium contract when h2 < h
?.
The case of the negligence rule corresponds to the reduction function z(x) restricted
to either 0 or 1, hence, a reduced indemnity (1− y2)I = 0 and a corresponding utility
level u1 = u(W − P − L). Similarly to (19), the insurer break-even constraint can be
written as W¯ ≥ K2(u0, v) with
K2(u0, v) =
(
1−
∑
i=1,2
hipiiGˆi(x2)
)
u−1(u0 + A− v∆)
+u−1(u0)
∑
i=1,2
hipiiGˆi(x2)− L
∑
i=1,2
hipii[1− Gˆi(x2)] (22)
which is a convex function of u0 and v, satisfying ∂K2∂u0 > 0 and ∂K2∂v < 0. We
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also have
Eu? =
∑
i=1,2
hi {(1− pii)(A−∆v + u0)
+pii[Gˆi(x2)u0 + (1− Gˆi(x2))u(u−1(A−∆v + u0)− L)]− di(θi)
}
≡ U(u0, v)
which is a concave function of u0 and v if u is DARA, with ∂U/∂u0 > 0 and ∂U/∂v < 0.
Under the conditions given in Proposition 3, it is shown in the appendix that the
negligence rule leads to v < A/∆, i.e. I < L, at the optimum, as illustrated in Figure
5.
Proposition 5 Assume n = 2. There exists h?? ∈ (0, 1) such that the optimal third-
best solution under the negligence rule with b¯ = 1 dominates the no-audit optimal
solution if h2 < h
??. The corresponding optimal contract provides partial coverage, i.e.
I < L.
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Proposition 5 states that the desirability of the negligence rule depends on h2 being
larger or smaller than threshold h??. To intuitively interpret this result, observe that
gˆ2(x)/gˆ1(x)→ +∞ when x→ 1 yields x2 → 1 when h2 = 1− h1 → 0, everything else
being equal. Thus, when h2 is small, the negligence rule resembles an almost perfectly
targeted penalty imposed only in case of misbehavior b = 2, hence the dominance
result.35 However, the all-or-nothing intrinsic feature of the negligence rule limits the
scope of its incentive power, and it should be completed by partial coverage.
4.2 The three-state case
Suppose now that B = {1, 2, 3} and Θ = {θ1, θ2, θ3}, hence two types of misconduct
and three states, with db(θ1) < db(θ2) < db(θ3) for all b ∈ B. We assume that, at an
optimal third-best allocation, the policyholder chooses b∗(θi) = bi, the adjacent ex post
incentive constraints of types i = 1, 2 being binding (i.e. in state θi, the policyholder
is incentivized not too choose bi+1). Thresholds x2 and x3 satisfy 1 − Pr(b = b1|x =
x2) = Pr(b = b3|x = x3) = α. We have
ub = (1− pib)uˆ+ pibu0 − vpib[1− Gˆb(x2)]− v¯pib[1− Gˆb(x3)],
where uˆ = u(W − P ), u0 = u(W − P − L + I), v = u0 − u(W − P − L + (1 − y2)I)
and v¯ = u(W − P − L + (1 − y2)I) − u(W − P − L + (1 − y3)I). We thus have
v > 0 and v¯ > 0 if y2 > 0 and y3 > y2, respectively. Adjacent incentive constraints
u2 − u3 ≥ d2(θ2)− d3(θ2) and u1 − u2 ≥ d1(θ1)− d2(θ1) may be written as
uˆ ≥ max
i=1,2
{u0 + Ai − v∆i(x2)− v¯∆i(x3)},
where Ai = [di(θi)−di+1(θi)]/(pii+1−pii) > 0 and ∆i(x) = [Gi(x)−Gi+1(x)]/(pii+1−pii) >
0. When both incentive constraints are binding, we have
M ·
[
v
v¯
]
=
[
A1 − z
A2 − z
]
, (23)
35This is true under any standard of proof α ∈ [1/2, 1). To make a link with Proposition 3, note that
for h2 given, a large enough value of α also guarantees that x2 is close to 1, with the same dominance
conclusion.
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where z ≡ uˆ− u0 ≥ 0, z ≤ min{A1, A2}, and
M =
[
∆1(x2) ∆1(x3)
∆2(x2) ∆2(x3)
]
.
Appendix H characterizes a family of probability distributions that satisfies MLRP
and such that detM = ∆1(x2)∆2(x3) − ∆1(x3)∆2(x2) > 0. In Proposition 6 below,
we assume that the probability distributions of x, conditional on b = 1 or 2, belong
to this family. It can be easily shown that 0 ≤ z ≤ Lu′(w − L) ≡ zˆ, which leads to
Proposition 6 that provides a sufficient condition under which v > 0 and v¯ > 0 at a
solution of (23).
Proposition 6 Assume n = 3. If
∆2(x3)
∆1(x3)
>
A2
A1
>
∆2(x2)
∆1(x2)
, (24)
then for zˆ small enough, we have y3 > y2 > 0 at any third-best optimal allocation where
the adjacent incentive constraints are binding.
Proposition 6 provides sufficient conditions under which the optimal insurance law
includes two levels of indemnity reductions, according to the severity of the misconducts
that can be credibly alleged. An intuitive interpretation of this proposition is as follows.
Let βi(x) ≡ pii+1[1−Gˆi+1(x)]−pii[1−Gˆi(x)] be the increase in the probability of a signal
larger than x > 0 when the policyholder changes her behavior from b = i to b = i+ 1.
In state i, βi(x2) and βi(x3) can be considered as indexes of the incentive power of the
signal x evaluated at the thresholds x2 and x3, respectively, these thresholds depending
on α and the probabilities of states h1, h2 and h3. A simple calculation gives
∆′i(x)/∆i(x) = β
′
i(x)/βi(x). (25)
The class of probability distributions characterized in Appendix H is such that
β′1(x)/β1(x) < β
′
2(x)/β2(x) < 0 for all x, (26)
Thus, for this class of probability distributions, when x is increasing, the incentive
power index βi(x) decreases more strongly in state 1 than state 2. Intuitively, the
low threshold x2 then affects relatively more the policyholder in state 1 than in state
2, and conversely for the high threshold x3. Decreasing the indemnity in proportions
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y2 > 0 and y3 − y2 > 0 at the two successive thresholds x2 and x3 is a way to fine-
tune the incentives in our multi-state setting. (25) and (26) yield ∆2(x2)/∆1(x2) <
∆2(x3)/∆1(x3), hence the outer inequality in (24). The other inequalities depend on
the costs of effort and on the loss, reflected by A1, A2 and zˆ, respectively. If they
are satisfied, the separation of states through this fine-tuning of incentives is actually
optimal.
5 The burden of proof
5.1 Litigation process and the cost of information
We consider in the following that providing evidence to the court is costly for both the
insured and the insurer. For the latter, auditing a claim at cost c only provides soft
information about the circumstances of the loss: the insurer can observe x through an
audit, but more evidence is needed to sustain an allegation in court (i.e. to upgrade
observed circumstances to verifiable hard information).36 Similarly, while she knows
the circumstances x of the loss, sustaining a claim by verifiable information is costly
to the policyholder, although presumably at a cost smaller than the one incurred by
the insurer. Whatever the standard of proof α (considered as given in what follows),
this raises the question of the allocation of the burden of proof, i.e. the obligation
of a party to produce the evidence that will prove its claim against the other party
who is given the “benefit of the doubt”. These verification costs are at the origin of
an additional efficiency loss and accordingly, we qualify the optimal allocation in this
setting as a fourth-best solution to the insurance moral hazard problem.
Consider first that the burden of proof is on the policyholder, and the insurer is
given the benefit of the doubt. We assume that it costs the insured kP per dollar of
indemnity to produce evidence on the circumstances of the loss. We also assume that
evidence can only be found about the actual events that generated the loss, i.e. that the
information cannot be distorted or forged.37 In other words, the policyholder can only
prove (at cost kP ) that the circumstances are x if she wants to refute the allegation of
the insurer. The insurance law design problem is modified as follows:
- Stages 0 to 4 are unaffected, but the information x obtained by the insurer in case
36For instance, reliable testimonies by witnesses or technical reports in corporate or personal liability
issues, expert reports in property claims, medical certificates in medical malpractice claims or some
kind of psychological report in work harassment cases.
37Crocker and Morgan (1997) develop a theory of claim falsification, in which policyholders spend
resources to distort the information insurers perceive about their loss.
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of an audit is only soft information. Hence, the insurer’s allegation b ∈ {2, . . . , n}
is not sustained by evidence, i.e. it does not allow the judge to verify the true
value x.
- Stage 5: the policyholder may contest in court the insurer’s allegation by transmit-
ting verifiable information about x to the judge at cost kP . In that case, the judge
proves the insured right if the insurer allegation is not credible, i.e. b > bˆ(x),
which entitles the insured to receive the full indemnity I. Otherwise, the judge
confirms the insurer’s allegation and the rule of law yb applies.
- Stage 6 is unaffected.
In sum, the only difference with the game described Section 3 is that the policy-
holder incurs cost kP to contest the insurer’s allegation. Note that the contractual
indemnity I is entirely paid if the judge proves the insured right. We will discuss this
assumption below, but we may already consider it as corresponding to a bad faith
clause frequently applied in insurance law: if bˆ(x) < b, the judge considers that the
insurer was plainly deceptive and he obliges him to pay the contractual indemnity as
bad faith penalty.38
After an audit that revealed x, the insurer knows that any allegation b > bˆ(x) at
stage 4 will be successfully contested by the insured at stage 5 if and only if kP ≤ yb,
because otherwise contesting the insurer’s allegation would not be worthwhile. Let
x? = inf{x ∈ (0, 1] : ybˆ(x) ≥ kP}. (27)
When x ≥ x?, it is optimal for the policyholder to contest any allegation b > bˆ(x),
with net gain
(yb − kP )I ≥ (ybˆ(x) − kP )I ≥ 0.
Consequently, when the insurer observes x ≥ x? through an audit, it is an optimal
strategy for him to allege misbehavior bˆ(x), and this will not be contested by the
insured.
When x < x?, we have ybˆ(x) < kP and the insurer knows that any allegation b > bˆ(x)
will be successfully contested by the policyholder if yb ≥ kP , i.e. if b ≥ bˆ(x?). Hence, an
optimal insurer’s strategy consists in alleging the misconduct immediately lower than
bˆ(x?), i.e. b = bˆ(x?)− 1, which will not be contested by the policyholder.
38Should the insurer have alleged b = bˆ(x), then he would have been allowed to reduce the indemnity
by a fraction ybˆ(x).
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The indemnity reduction is
z(x) =
{
ybˆ(x?)−1 if x < x
?
ybˆ(x) if x ≥ x?
(28)
instead of (11), and, whatever the case, the insured does not contest the insurer’s
allegation. The corresponding break-even condition for the insurer is given by
P ≥
∫
Θ
pib?(θ)
{
I +
∫ 1
0+
cE[q(s)|x]gˆb?(θ)(x)dx
− I
(∫ x?
0+
ybˆ(x?)−1 +
∫ 1
x?
ybˆ(x)
)
E[q(s)|x]gˆb?(θ)(x)dx
}
dH(θ), (29)
instead of (13), where the curly bracketed terms are successively the contractual in-
demnity, the expected audit cost, and the expected indemnity reduction.
Consider now that the burden of proof is on the insurer, and the policyholder is
given the benefit of the doubt. In that case, the insurer may incur two information
costs: firstly, audit cost c if signal s about the circumstances of the loss is large enough
to trigger an audit; and secondly, the cost kI (per dollar of indemnity) of providing
verifiable information about x. Hence, the insured-insurer game after a claim is similar
to the case where the information x is verifiable, but with the additional cost kI for
the insurer if he wants to allege some behavior b ∈ {2, ..., n}. Consequently, after an
audit at stage 3, the insurer alleges misconduct b = bˆ(x) if and only if ybˆ(x) ≥ kI , and
thus the equilibrium indemnity reduction is
z(x) =
{
0 if x < x˜
ybˆ(x) if x ≥ x˜
(30)
instead of (11), where
x˜ = inf{x ∈ (0, 1] : ybˆ(x) ≥ kI}. (31)
Hence, x˜ is the threshold above which the insurer finds it worthwhile to gather verifiable
evidence about the circumstances of the claim, in order to convince the judge that the
insured’s behavior was bˆ(x) or worse. The break-even condition is
P ≥
∫
Θ
pib?(θ)
{
I +
∫ 1
0+
cE[q(s)|x]gˆb?(θ)(x)dx− I
∫ 1
x˜
(ybˆ(x) − kI)E[q(s)|x]gˆb?(θ)(x)dx
}
dH(θ)
(32)
instead of (13), where the curly bracketed terms are successively the contractual in-
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demnity, the expected audit cost, and the expected indemnity reduction, net of the
cost of providing verifiable information.
Comparing the two cases yields the following proposition.
Proposition 7 If kP ≤ kI (or if kP − kI is positive but not too large), an optimal
fourth-best solution to the insurance moral hazard problem requires that the burden of
proof is on the policyholder.
The intuition of this result is twofold. Firstly, when the insurer has the burden of
proof and wants to contest a claim, he must provide the court with costly evidence,
whereas he only has to allege misconduct that will not be contested when he has
the benefit of doubt and the insured is given the burden of proof. Thus, attributing
the burden of proof to the policyholder is a way to avoid the cost of transmitting hard
evidence to the court. Secondly, it would be too costly for the insurer to contest a claim
when x is small if he has the burden of proof, which implies the constraint z(x) = 0 if
x < x˜. Conversely, when the burden of proof is given to the policyholder, the insurer
has some leeway to nitpick when circumstances are favorable to the policyholder, since
he may reduce the indemnity by a fraction z(x) = ybˆ(x?)−1 if x < x
?.
This is illustrated by Figure 6 in the case n = 4, with kP = kI and x
? = x˜ = x3. The
step function in solid (black) lines corresponds to the optimal function ybˆ(x). The dotted
(red) and dashed (blue) step functions correspond to function z(·) when the burden of
proof is on the insurer and on the policyholder, respectively. Choosing y2 = 0 allows
us to replicate the outcome of a legal regime where the insurer has the burden of proof
with one where he is given the benefit of the doubt. As the evidential cost kP is not
incurred at equilibrium when the policyholder has the burden of proof, whereas kI
is spent if x ≥ x3 when the insurer has to prove his allegation, we may deduce that
providing the benefit of the doubt to the insurer dominates the legal regime where he
has the burden of proof.
5.2 Out-of-court settlements and bad faith penalties
Most civil cases do not end up in court and one may wonder whether the possibility of
out-of-court settlements affect our conclusions. Assume that the insurer has the burden
of proof. Under circumstances x, he may propose to the policyholder a reduction in
indemnity yˆ such that 0 ≤ ybˆ(x)(x)− kI ≤ yˆ ≤ ybˆ(x): in words, the insurer can credibly
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Figure 6: Burden of proof and insurance indemnity
obtain a net gain ybˆ(x)−kI by going to court, and the out-of-court settlement would be
a better deal for him and for the policyholder. Consequently, the indemnity reduction
offered by the insurer and accepted by the policyholder is
z(x) =
{
0 if x < x˜
ybˆ(x) if x ≥ x˜
where x˜ is still defined by (31). As the insurer does not incur the cost kI , his break-even
condition is
P ≥
∫
Θ
pib?(θ)
{
I +
∫ 1
0+
cE[q(s)|x]gˆb?(θ)(x)dx− I
∫ 1
x˜
ybˆ(x)E[q(s)|x]gˆb?(θ)(x)dx
}
dH(θ).
(33)
Comparing (29) and (33) with kP ≤ kI , shows that giving the burden of proof to
the insurer with the possibility of out-of-court settlement is equivalent to giving the
burden of proof to the insured and prohibiting indemnity reductions for small values
of x. It is therefore more restrictive and dominated by the solution where the burden
of proof is on the insured. Consequently:
34
Corollary 1 Proposition 7 remains true if the insurer can take the initiative of an
out-of-court settlement when he has the burden of proof.
We have assumed that the insurer must pay the entire contractual indemnity I, and
not the reduced indemnity I[1 − ybˆ(x)], if he has initially the benefit of the doubt but
he is contradicted by the judge. Having to pay the additional amount ybˆ(x)I may thus
be interpreted as a penalty reflecting the importance of utmost good faith in insurance
law.39 We could move further in that direction, and look for an optimal bad faith
penalty. An hypothetical legal regime could consist in giving the burden of proof to
the policyholder, with an insurer bad faith penalty at least equal to [kP − (yb− ybˆ(x))]I
to be paid to the policyholder, in addition to the indemnity [1−ybˆ(x)]I when misconduct
b > bˆ(x) is alleged by the insurer, and successfully contested by the policyholder. Under
such a regime, the policyholder is incentivized to contest any exaggerated allegation
because her cost kP I will be reimbursed if the judge agrees with her, and consequently
the insurer restricts himself to indemnity reductions that can be sustained in court.
The third-best optimal solution could be reached in such an hypothetical legal regime,
in which the policyholder has the burden of proof and the insurer has to pay her
a sufficiently high bad faith penalty. Unfortunately, although in some cases courts
may sentence insurers to pay compensatory penalties to policyholders, it would be
unwise to conclude that this is the ultimate solution to the moral hazard problem. In
practice, courts cannot assess the policyholders’ cost of gathering evidence about the
circumstances of their loss. This is private information that cannot be easily estimated.
Obliging the insurer to pay the contractual indemnity in case of bad faith is thus a
convenient, albeit less effective, alternative to the cost-reimbursement solution.
6 Conclusion
When the insurance policy does not specify the indemnity payment according to all the
contingencies that may characterize the claim, insurance contracts are incomplete. In
a context of moral hazard, conditioning the indemnity on the circumstances of the loss
39From an empirical standpoint, insurers’ bad faith penalties play a more or less important role ac-
cording to the specificities of insurance law. In the US, most states recognize the right of policyholders
to file private lawsuits against insurers alleging unfair claim settlement practices involving first-party
insurance coverage. Some states consider bad faith as a breach of contract, while others consider
it as a tort, allowing the policyholder to recover for all harm or injuries sustained, including legal
expenses, economic loss, and mental distress, while punitive damages may also be awarded. Tennyson
& Warfel (2009) describe these various approaches. Asmat & Tennyson (2014) show that, on average,
tort liability for insurer’s bad faith is associated with higher settlement amounts.
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is nevertheless desirable in order to incentivize policyholders to exert an adequate level
of effort. This can be indirectly reached through provisions of insurance law. Legal
principles that allow insurers to reduce or cancel compensation under unfavorable claim
circumstances act as an incentive device, and improve contractual efficiency. When
audit only yields non-verifiable information to the insurer, then the burden of proof
should be given to policyholders, while threatening bad faith penalties against insurers.
Note that a difference should be made between insurance lines, depending on the
degree of contract incompleteness. Automobile insurance and D&O insurance provide
extreme cases in this respect, with well-established and smooth-running accident veri-
fication protocols in the first case, and a diversity of complex or opaque situations in
the second. Our model justifies the fact that competition among car insurers primarily
goes through the offer of rather complex contracts, including non-constant deductibles,
experience rating or pay as you drive, while for D&O insurers, the question naturally
arises as to whether the behavior of the insured is compatible with the coverage, which
may require launching a costly audit and possibly deny coverage. These two extreme
cases suggest that an inverse relationship may exist among insurance lines between
contracts complexity matched with automated claim handling processes on one side,
and the frequency of coverage denials based on insurance law principles on the other.
Investigating how the various lines of insurance are positioned in this relationship is
an empirical question that would be worth investigating.
From a more normative standpoint, our analysis also emphasizes the efficiency
gains that could be derived from legal principles that would not reduce the insurer’s
leeway to an all-or-nothing alternative, as under the negligence rule. Adapting the
diversity of penalties that may be imposed to policyholders to the diversity of possible
misconducts is a way to improve the trade-off between risk-sharing and incentives under
moral hazard.
These conclusions have been reached in a setting that could be easily extended in
several directions. In particular, the relationship between insurer, insured and courts
could also be modeled in a richer and more interactive way, but the same fundamental
trade-off between conditioning the indemnity on circumstances to incentivize policy-
holders and limiting the opportunism of the insurers would remain, and thus similar
results would emerge.
Much remains to be done in order to explore the consequences of the incomplete-
ness of insurance contracts in other directions. The issues of insurance fraud and bad
faith in insurance contracting are of special interest. In particular, many theory papers
about insurance fraud have restricted their attention to models where opportunistic
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policyholders file claims although they did not suffer any loss, or build up their claims
above their true loss, and insurers may verify claims through costly audits.40 In prac-
tice, such a clear-cut framework is far less frequent than more fuzzy situations where
policyholders may claim they were in good faith because their situation was not clearly
specified in their insurance policy, and ambiguity prevails on the duty of the contracting
parties. Whatever the interaction process between policyholder and insurer, whether
it be an amicable settlement or a litigation process, its outcome will be determined
by stipulations of insurance law, such as the definition and consequences of misrep-
resentation and non-disclosure, the legal regime for bad faith in claims settlement,
the interpretation of contractual exclusion clauses or the allocation of the burden of
proof.41
It is also worth emphasizing that similar issues arise in other types of principal-
agent relationships, where the incompleteness of contracts results from the difficulty to
objectively measure individualized performance signals (e.g., customer satisfaction or
involvement in cooperative tasks, in the case of job-related activities). The literature on
relational contracts (Levin, 2003; MacLeod, 2003) characterizes mechanisms that may
allow the truthful revelation of unverifiable information in such settings. For instance,
the payment of bonuses may be transferred to a third-party acting as an independent
referee, similar to a private or state-sponsored ombudsman. We have followed another
route, by focusing attention on the role of contract law. Clearly, both approaches are
complementary, as illustrated by insurance and labor markets, where the enforcement
of legal principles and arbitration processes coexist.
40See Picard (2013) for a survey on the economic analysis of insurance fraud.
41As an illustration, see Tennyson & Warfel (2009) and Asmat & Tennyson (2014) on the effect
of the insurance bad faith legal regime on claims settlement, the settlement process, and insurance
markets.
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Appendix
A Proof of Proposition 1
Let h(θ) denote the density function –or the mass of probability if any– of θ in Θ. Let
µb(θ) ≥ 0 and λ ≥ 0 be Lagrange multipliers associated with (3) and (4), respectively.
Denoting W (θ, x) ≡ W − P − L + I(θ, x), the first-order optimality conditions w.r.t.
I(θ, x) lead to
u′(W (θ, x))
1− ∑
b 6=b?(θ)
µb(θ)
h(θ)
(
pib
pib?(θ)
gˆb(x)
gˆb?(θ)(x)
− 1
)

≤ λ if I(θ, x) = 0,
= λ if 0 < I(θ, x) < L,
≥ λ if I(θ, x) = L,
(34)
for all (θ, x) ∈ Θ× [0, 1].
Note that, for all θ ∈ Θ, the optimal solution is such that b > b?(θ) for all b 6= b?(θ)
such that (3) is binding,42 and also that µb(θ) = 0 for all b 6= b?(θ) such that (3) is not
binding. Let
φb(x) ≡ gˆb+1(x)
gˆb(x)
for all b = 1, ..., n− 1.
Hence, the l.h.s. of (34) may be written as
u′(W (θ, x))
1− ∑
b>b?(θ)
µb(θ)
h(θ)
 pib
pib?(θ)
b−1∏
i=b?(θ)
φi(x)− 1
 ,
where the bracketed is decreasing w.r.t. to x if b?(θ) < n, because φ′b(x) > 0. This
implies λ > 0.43 Let θ ∈ Θ such that b?(θ) < n. We have
I ′x(θ, x) =
1
λ
u′(W (θ, x))2
u′′(W (θ, x))
∑
b>b?(θ)
µb(θ)
h(θ)
pib
pib?(θ)
d
dx
 b−1∏
i=b?(θ)
φi(x)
 < 0,
42Indeed if there exists b ∈ B such that b < b?(θ) and the incentive constraint (3) is binding,
then replacing b?(θ) by b would reduce the expected insurance cost - i.e. the right-hand-side of (4) -
because pib < pib?(θ), without changing the policyholder’s expected utility. This would contradict the
optimality of the solution.
43The assumption made in footnote 19 implies 0 < I(θ, x) < L in a positive-measure subset of
Θ× (0, 1], which yields λ > 0.
41
if 0 < I(θ, x) < L. We have I(θ, 0) < L - and thus I(θ, x) < L for all x - if
u′(W − P )
1− ∑
b>b?(θ)
µb(θ)
h(θ)
 pib
pib?(θ)
d
dx
 b−1∏
i=b?(θ)
φi(0)
− 1
 ≤ λ,
and otherwise, we have I(θ, x) = L if 0 ≤ x ≤ x(θ) and I(θ, x) < L if x > x(θ), with
x(θ) > 0 defined by
u′(W − P )
1− ∑
b>b?(θ)
µb(θ)
h(θ)
 pib
pib?(θ)
d
dx
 b−1∏
i=b?(θ)
φi(x(θ))
− 1
 = λ.
Similarly, we have I(θ, 1) > 0 - and thus I(θ, x) > 0 for all x - if
u′(W − P − L)
1− ∑
b>b?(θ)
µb(θ)
h(θ)
 pib
pib?(θ)
d
dx
 b−1∏
i=b?(θ)
φi(1)
− 1
 ≥ λ,
and otherwise, we have I(θ, x) = 0 if x¯(θ) ≤ x ≤ 1 and I(θ, x) > 0 if x < x¯(θ), with
x¯(θ) > 0 defined by
u′(W − P − L)
1− ∑
b>b?(θ)
µb(θ)
h(θ)
 pib
pib?(θ)
d
dx
 b−1∏
i=b?(θ)
φi(x¯(θ))
− 1
 = λ.
If b?(θ) = n, then the l.h.s. of (34) is equal to u′(W (θ, x)), which implies that
W (θ, x) and I(θ, x) do not depend on x.
B Proof of Lemma 1
Let
Φ(b0, x) = (1− α)
∑n
b=b0
Pr(b|x)− α
∑b0−1
b=1
Pr(b|x)
=
(1− α)∑nb=b0 gb(x) ∫Θ?b dH(θ)− α∑b0−1b=1 gb(x) ∫Θ?b dH(θ)∑
b∈B gb(x)
∫
Θ?b
dH(θ)
,
for b0 ≥ 2 and x ∈ (0, 1]. When bˆ(x) ≥ 2, we have
bˆ(x) = sup{b0 ∈ B|Φ(b0, x) > 0}.
42
Let x′ > x. Using strict MLRP yields
gb(x
′) > gb(x)
gb0(x
′)
gb0(x)
if b > b0,
gb(x
′) < gb(x)
gb0(x
′)
gb0(x)
if b < b0.
Hence, if b0 ≥ 2 and x′ > x, we have Φ(b0, x′) > 0 if Φ(b0, x) > 0. We deduce
bˆ(x′) ≥ bˆ(x) if bˆ(x) ≥ 2 and x′ > x, which implies that bˆ(x) is non-decreasing in [0, 1].
It is thus a step function that takes its values in B.
Let x0, x1 ∈ (0, 1], x0 < x1. Φ(b, x) is continuous w.r.t. x, and thus Φ(bˆ(x1), x0) > 0
when x1 is close enough to x0, implying bˆ(x0) ≥ bˆ(x1). Since bˆ(·) is non-decreasing, we
must have bˆ(x0) = bˆ(x1), which implies that bˆ(·) is left-continuous.
C Proof of Lemma 2
First, we show that
Lemma 3 When f(ε) is log-concave, an increase in s shifts the probability distribution
of x conditionally on s in the sense of strong FOSD.
Proof. Let g˜(x) =
∫
Θ
gb?(θ)(x)dH(θ) be the density function of x for the equilibrium
behavior rule b?(θ). Using Bayes Rule and the independence of ε and x allows us to
write de conditional density function of x as
g˜(x|s) = f(s− x)g˜(x)∫ 1
0
f(s− u)g˜(u)du,
and thus the conditional c.d.f. of x is given by
G˜(x|s) =
∫ x
0
f(s− u)g˜(u)du∫ 1
0
f(s− u)g˜(u)du .
Differentiating G˜(x|s) w.r.t. s shows that G˜(x|s) is decreasing in s if
ϕ(x) ≡
∫ x
0
f ′(s− u)g˜(u)du∫ x
0
f(s− u)g˜(u)du <
∫ 1
0
f ′(s− u)g˜(u)du∫ 1
0
f(s− u)g˜(u)du . (35)
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ϕ′(x) > 0 is a sufficient condition for (35) to hold for all x ∈ [0, 1]. This is true if
f ′(s− x)
f(s− x) >
∫ x
0
f ′(s− u)g˜(u)du∫ x
0
f(s− u)g˜(u)du . (36)
Let η(ε) = f ′(ε)/f(ε) = d ln f(ε)/dε for all ε such that f(ε) > 0. (36) is rewritten as
η(s− x) >
∫ x
0
η(s− u)f(s− u)g˜(u)du∫ x
0
f(s− u)g˜(u)du . (37)
Assume that η′(ε) = d2 ln f(ε)/dε2 < 0. Then we have η(s − u) < η(s − x) for all
u ∈ [0, x) and (37) holds.
We know that, yb ≤ yb+1 for all b ∈ {1, ..., n − 1} and, furthermore, that bˆ(x)
is non-decreasing from Lemma 1. Consequently, ybˆ(x) is non-decreasing with x and
Lemma 3 shows that E[ybˆ(x)|s] is non-decreasing with s. Hence, E[ybˆ(x)|s]I ≥ c implies
E[ybˆ(x)|s′]I ≥ c if s′ > s, which proves the Lemma by using (9).
D Proof of Proposition 2
Assume first c = 0. In that case, q(s) = 1 for all s, i.e. s? = −∞. Let us restrict the
set of feasible solutions to yb = y ≥ 0 for all b ≥ 2. We have z(x) = 0 if x < x2 and
z(x) = y if x ≥ x2 with x2 the solution of bˆ(x2) = 2, or equivalently
(1− α)
∑n
b=2
Pr(b˜ = b|x2) = αPr(b˜ = 1|x2),
where b˜ is the behavior of an individual who is randomly drawn among the claimants.
This condition can be written as
(1− α)
∑n
b=2
gb(x2)
g1(x2)
∫
Θ?b
dH(θ) = α
∫
Θ?1
dH(θ). (38)
From MLRP, the l.h.s. of (38) is increasing in x2, and it goes to 0 (resp. to
+∞) when x2 goes to zero (resp. to 1) if
∫
Θ?1
dH(θ) 6= 0, 1. The sets Θ?1, . . . ,Θ?n
depend on I, P and y, and thus (38) implicitly defines function x2(I, P, y) ∈ (0, 1), with
x2(I, P, 0) = x2na if I, P is the optimal no-audit contract. Let λ > 0 and µb(θ) ≥ 0
for b ∈ B, θ ∈ Θ, be Lagrange multipliers corresponding to the insurer’s break-even
constraint and the incentive constraints, respectively. Denote u(1) and u′(1) (resp.
u(2) and u′(2)) the value of the utility function and of its derivative when x < x2
44
(resp. when x ≥ x2) in the case of an accident. The first-order optimality conditions
w.r.t. I and y are written as∫
Θ
{[
u′(1)Gb?(θ)(x2) + u′(2)(1− y)[1−Gb?(θ)(x2)]
−λ [1− y[1−Gb?(θ)(x2)]]} dH(θ)
−
∫
Θ
{
∑
b∈B
µb(θ)
{
u′(1)[Gb(x2)−Gb?(θ)(x2)]
+u′(2)(1− y)[Gb?(θ)(x2)−Gb(x2)]
}}
dH(θ)
− ∂x2
∂I
×B
≥ 0,= 0 if I < L, (39)
and
I[λ− u′(2)]
∫
Θ
[1−Gb?(θ)(x2)]dH(θ)
+ u′(2)I
∫
Θ
∑
b∈B
µb(θ)[Gb?(θ)(x2)−Gb(x2)]dH(θ)
− ∂x2
∂y
×B
≤ 0,= 0 if y > 0, (40)
respectively, where
B = [u(1)− u(2)]
∫
Θ
{gb?(θ)(x2) +
∑
b∈Bµb(θ)[gb?(θ)(x2)− gb(x2)]}dH(θ)
+ λy
∫
Θ
gb?(θ)(x2)dH(θ).
Suppose that y = 0 at an optimal solution. This implies I < L and x2 = x2na, because
I = L would imply b?na(θ) = n for all θ, which has been excluded by assumption. In
that case, we have u(1) = u(2) ≡ u, u′(1) = u′(2) ≡ u′ and B = 0. (39) and (40)
simplify to ∫
Θ
{(u′ − λ)pib?na(θ) − u′
∑
b∈B
µb(θ)(pib − pib?na(θ))}dH(θ) = 0, (41)
45
and
(λ− u′)
∫
Θ
[1−Gb?na(θ)(x2na)]dH(θ)
+ u′
∫
Θ
∑
b∈B
µb(θ)[Gb?na(θ)(x2na)−Gb(x2na)]dH(θ) ≤ 0, (42)
respectively. Substituting the value of u′ − λ given by (41) into (42) yields∫
Θ
∑
b∈B
µb(θ)(pib − pib?na(θ))dH(θ)×
∫
Θ
[1−Gb?na(θ)(x2na)]dH(θ)
+
∫
Θ
pib?na(θ)dH(θ)×
∫
Θ
∑
b∈B
µb(θ)[Gb?na(θ)(x2na)−Gb(x2na)]dH(θ) ≤ 0. (43)
There exists b ∈ B and a positive-measure subset of Θ in which µb(θ) > 0, once again
because otherwise we would have b?na(θ) = n almost everywhere in Θ. Furthermore,
we have b > b?na(θ) and pib > pib?na(θ) if µb(θ) > 0 at y = 0 since this corresponds to
the no-audit solution where the argument of footnote 42 is valid. This still holds for
y positive and small enough, and implies that the first product in (43) is positive.
Similarly, MLRP implies FOSD, which yields Gb(x2na) < Gb?na(θ)(x2na). Since this is
true for all θ ∈ Θ, the second product in (43) is also positive, hence a contradiction.
Consequently, when c = 0 we have z(x) > 0 in a positive-measure subset of [0, 1].
As the optimal expected utility of the policyholder varies continuously with c, the
previous conclusion remains true with s? < +∞ when c is not too large.
E Proof of Proposition 3
Let us consider the problem in which Eu? given by (12) is maximized w.r.t. P, I, q(·)
and z(·), subject (14)–(16), and with ybˆ(x) replaced by z(x) = 0 if x ≤ x¯ and z(x) = 1 if
x > x¯. This corresponds to our problem under the negligence rule, with the additional
condition
x¯ ∈ {x2, x3, ..., xm}, (44)
where x2, x3, ..., xm, m ≤ n, are the discontinuity points of bˆ(x) in [0, 1]. These disconti-
nuity points depend on the standard of proof α. Consider x¯ ∈ [0, 1] as a parameter and
let φ(x¯) be the value of Eu? at the relaxed problem where constraint (44) is ignored.
Note that φ(1) is the expected utility Eu? when no audit is possible. Assume first that
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c = 0, which gives q(s) = 1 for all s. In that case (10) and (13) can be rewritten as
ub = (1− pib)u(W − P ) + pibu(W − P − L+ I)Gˆb(x¯) + pibu(W − P − L)[1− Gˆb(x¯)],
and
P ≥ I
∫
Θ
pib?(θ)Gˆb?(θ)(x¯)dH(θ),
respectively. Let u0 ≡ u(W − P − L+ I) and u1 ≡ u(W − P − L), with u0 > u1 when
(P, I) is an optimal contract for parameter x¯, and let λ and µb(θ) be the Lagrange
multipliers corresponding to the insurer’s break-even constraint and the policyholder’s
incentive constraint respectively when x¯ is close to 1. Using the envelope theorem
yields
φ′(x¯) = (u0 − u1 − λI)
∫
Θ
pib?(θ)gˆb?(θ)(x¯)dH(θ)
+ (u0 − u1)
∫
Θ
∑
b∈B
µb(θ)[pib?(θ)gˆb?(θ)(x¯)− pibgˆb(x¯)]dH(θ) (45)
≤ (u0 − u1)
∫
Θ
pib?(θ)gb?(θ)(x¯)
{
1 +
∑
b∈B
µb(θ)[1− pibgˆb(x¯)/pib?(θ)gˆb?(θ)(x¯)]
}
dH(θ).
The same arguments as in the proof of Proposition 2 show that, when x¯ is close to 1,
there exists b ∈ B and a positive-measure subset of Θ in which µb(θ) > 0, and also
that b > b?(θ) and pib > pib?(θ) if µb(θ) > 0. Using limx→1 gˆb+1(x)/gˆb(x) → +∞ when
x → 1 shows that the r.h.s of (45) is negative when x¯ is close to 1. We deduce that
φ(x¯) is decreasing in an interval [x¯?, 1] with x¯? < 1. As the optimal expected utility of
the policyholder varies continuously with c, this remains true when c is not too large.
Let x2(x¯, α), x3(x¯, α), . . . , xm(x¯,α)(x¯, α) be the discontinuity points of function bˆ(x, α)
– where we explicitly emphasize the dependence of bˆ(·) on the standard of proof α –
associated to the optimal solution of the above relaxed problem with threshold x¯.
Here m(x¯, α) ∈ B denotes the largest misconduct that can be credibly alleged, i.e.
bˆ(x, α) = m(x¯, α) for all x ∈ [xm(x¯,α)(x¯, α), 1]. For all b = 2, . . . ,m(x¯, α), xb(x¯, α) is
increasing w.r.t. α and xb(x¯, α) → 1 for all x¯ when α → 1. If xm(x¯?,α)(x¯?, 1/2) ≥ x¯?,
let α¯ = 1/2. If xm(x¯?,α)(x¯
?, 1/2) < x¯?, let α¯ > 1/2 defined by xm(x¯?,α)(x¯
?, α¯) = x¯?.
Hence, we have xm(x¯?,α)(x¯
?, α) ≥ x¯? if α ≥ α¯. Let b¯ = m(x¯?, α)− 1. Hence, under the
negligence rule with standard of care b¯ and standard of proof α ≥ α¯, the indemnity is
canceled if x > xm(x¯,α)(x¯
?, α) and it is fully paid otherwise. This is equivalent to the
relaxed problem with x¯ = xm(x¯?,α)(x¯
?, α) ∈ [x¯?, 1], and thus with φ(x¯) > φ(1) if α > α¯.
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F Proof of Proposition 4
Let us first show that y2 < 1 if A is not too large. The condition y2 ≤ 1 is equivalently
stated as v ≤ u0 − u(W − P − L) which is satisfied if v ≤ u0 − u(W − L), and since
v ≤ A/∆, if A/∆ ≤ u0 − u(W − L). As the condition K1(u0, v) = W¯ defines an
increasing relationship between v and u0, the equilibrium value of u0 is greater than
u?0 defined by K1(u
?
0, 0) = W¯ , i.e.
u−1(u?0)
∑
i=1,2
hipii + u
−1(u?0 + A)
[
1−
∑
i=1,2
hipii
]
= W¯ .
This condition implicitly defines u?0 as a function of A, with u
?′
0 (A) < 0 and u
?
0(0) =
u(W¯ ) > u(W −L). There is thus a unique A¯ > 0 satisfying A¯/∆ = u?0(A¯)− u(W −L)
for given W , L and ∆, and we have y2 ≤ 1 at equilibrium if A ≤ A¯.
We have v > 0 (i.e. y2 > 0) when the slope of the iso-utility lines is larger than
the one of the K1(u0, v) = W¯ locus at v = 0. Similarly, there is a corner solution with
v = A/∆ (i.e. I = L) when the slope of the iso-utility lines is larger than the one of
the K1(u0, v) = W¯ locus at that point. Using
∂K1(u0, v)
∂u0
=
∑2
i=1 hipiiGˆi(x2)
u′(u−1(u0))
+
∑2
i=1 hipii(1− Gˆi(x2))
u′(u−1(u0 − v)) +
1−∑2i=1 hipii
u′(u−1(u0 + A− v∆))
and
∂K1(u0, v)
∂v
= −
∑2
i=1 hipii(1− Gˆi(x2))
u′(u−1(u0 − v)) −∆
1−∑2i=1 hipii
u′(u−1(u0 + A− v∆)) ,
we have
dv
du0
∣∣∣∣
K1=W¯
v=0
=
∑2
i=1 hipii + (1−
∑2
i=1 hipii)u
′(u−1(u0))/u′(u−1(u0 + A))∑2
i=1 hipii(1− Gˆi(x2)) + ∆(1−
∑2
i=1 hipii)u
′(u−1(u0))/u′(u−1(u0 + A))
and
dv
du0
∣∣∣∣K1=W¯
v=A/∆
=
1−∑2i=1 hipii(1− Gˆi(x2)) +∑2i=1 hipii(1− Gˆi(x2))u′(u−1(u0))/u′(u−1(u0 − v))
∆(1−∑2i=1 hipii) +∑2i=1 hipii(1− Gˆi(x2))u′(u−1(u0))/u′(u−1(u0 − v)) .
The iso-utility lines are increasing straight lines in the (u0, v) plane, with slope
given by
dv
du0
∣∣∣∣
Eu?=cst
=
1
∆(1−∑2i=1 hipii) +∑2i=1 hipii(1− Gˆi(x2)) .
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Let
f0(γ) ≡
∑2
i=1 hipii + γ(1−
∑2
i=1 hipii)
γ∆(1−∑2i=1 hipii) +∑2i=1 hipii(1− Gˆi(x2)) ,
We have (dv/du0)|K1=W¯ ;v=0 = f0(u′(u−1(u0))/u′(u−1(u0+A))) where u′(u−1(u0))/u′(u−1(u0+
A)) > 1, while (dv/du0)|Eu?=cst = f0(1). Hence v > 0 if f0 is decreasing, i.e. if
0 >
(
1−
2∑
i=1
hipii
)[
γ∆(1−
2∑
i=1
hipii) +
2∑
i=1
hipii(1− Gˆi(x2))
]
−∆
(
1−
2∑
i=1
hipii
)[
2∑
i=1
hipii + γ(1−
2∑
i=1
hipii)
]
=
(
1−
2∑
i=1
hipii
)(
2∑
i=1
hipii(1− Gˆi(x2))−∆
2∑
i=1
hipii
)
This is alway true since we have
2∑
i=1
hipii(1− Gˆi(x2))−∆
2∑
i=1
hipii = −
2∑
i=1
hipii
[
Gˆi(x2)− pi2Gˆ2(x2)− pi1Gˆ1(x2))
pi2 − pi1
]
= − pi1pi2
pi2 − pi1 [Gˆ1(x2)− Gˆ2(x2)]
< 0.
Let
f1(γ) ≡ 1 + (γ − 1)
∑2
i=1 hipii(1− Gˆi(x2))
∆(1−∑2i=1 hipii) + γ∑2i=1 hipii(1− Gˆi(x2)) ,
we have (dv/du0)|K1=W¯ ;v=A/∆ = f1(u′(u−1(u0))/u′(u−1(u0−v))) where u′(u−1(u0))/u′(u−1(u0−
v)) < 1, while (dv/du0)|Eu?=cst = f1(1). We thus have (dv/du0)|K1=W¯ ;v=A/∆ < (dv/du0)|Eu?=cst
if f1 is increasing, i.e. if
∆
(
1−
∑
i=1,2
hipii
)
> 1−
∑
i=1,2
hipii(1− Gˆi(x2)) = 1− pi1(1− Gˆ1(x2))− h2(pi2 − pi1)∆,
hence if ∆ > (1− pi1(1− Gˆ1(x2)))/(1− pi1) which may be rewritten as
Gˆ2(x2)
Gˆ1(x2)
<
pi1(1− pi2)
pi2(1− pi1) ≡ R < 1, (46)
where x2 > 0 is defined by (17). We know from MLRP, that gˆ2(x)/gˆ1(x) is increasing
for all x ∈ (0, 1]. Using gˆ2(x)/gˆ1(x) → 0 when x → 0 and gˆ2(x)/gˆ1(x) → +∞ when
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x → 1, implies 0 < x2 < 1. Given pi1 and pi2, (17) defines x2 as a decreasing function
of h2 : x2 = x2(h2) with dx2/dh2 < 0, x2(h2) → 1 when h2 → 0 and x2(h2) → 0 when
h2 → 1. Define ψ(x) = Gˆ2(x)/Gˆ1(x) where x > 0. We have
ψ′(x) = [gˆ2(x)Gˆ1(x)− gˆ1(x)Gˆ2(x)]/Gˆ1(x)2
= Gˆ1(x)
−2
∫ x
0
[gˆ2(x)gˆ1(y)− gˆ1(x)gˆ2(y)]dy
> 0
since, from MLRP, gˆ2(x)/gˆ1(x) > gˆ2(y)/gˆ1(y) for y < x. Moreover, l’Hoˆpital’s rule
gives limx→0 ψ(x) = limx→0 gˆ2(x)/gˆ1(x) = 0 and we also have ψ(1) = 1. Function ψ(x)
is thus an increasing bijection from (0, 1] to itself. Condition (46) can be written as
ψ(x2(h2)) < R, hence x2(h2) < ψ
−1(R), i.e. h2 > x−12 (ψ
−1(R)) ≡ h?. We thus have
I = L if h2 ≥ h? and I < L if h2 < h?.
G Proof of Proposition 5
Let us first show that I < L at an optimal third-best solution under the negligence
rule. Differentiating (22) yields
∂K2(u0, v)
∂u0
=
1−∑i hipiiGˆi(x2)
u′(u−1(u0 + A− v∆)) +
∑
i hipiiGˆi(x2)
u′(u−1(u0))
and
∂K2(u0, v)
∂v
= −∆ 1−
∑
i hipiiGˆi(x2)
u′(u−1(u0 + A− v∆)) .
Hence, the slope of the insurer’s break-even locus is given by
dv
du0
∣∣∣∣
K2=W¯
=
1− [1− u′(u−1(u0 + A− v∆))/u′(u−1(u0))]
∑
i hipiiGˆi(x2)
∆(1−∑i hipiiGˆi(x2)) ,
and thus
dv
du0
∣∣∣∣K2=W¯
v=A/∆
=
1
∆[1−∑i hipiiGˆi(x2)] ≡ η.
Similarly, we have
dv
du0
∣∣∣∣
Eu?=cst
= Γ
(
u′(u−1(A−∆v + u0)− L)
u′(u−1(A−∆v + u0))
)
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where function Γ (·) is given by
Γ (γ) =
1 + (γ − 1)∑i hipii[1− Gˆi(x2)]
∆[1−∑i hipiiGˆi(x2) + (γ − 1)∑i hipii(1− Gˆi(x2))] ,
with Γ (1) = η and
Γ′ (γ) = − [
∑
i hipii(1− Gˆi(x2))]
∑
i hipiiGˆi(x2)
∆[1−∑i hipiiGˆi(x2) + (γ − 1)∑i hipii(1− Gˆi(x2))]2 < 0.
As u′(u−1(u0)−L) > u′(u−1(u0)), we have (dv/du0)|Eu?=cst,v=A/∆ < (dv/du0)|K2=W¯ ,v=A/∆,
which implies that v < A/∆, i.e. I < L at the optimum.
Let us now show that there exists h?? ∈ (0, 1) such that the optimal third-best
solution with b¯ = 1 dominates the optimal no-audit solution when h2 < h
??. Note that
x2 given by (17) is a decreasing function of h2, denoted xˆ2(h2), with xˆ2(h2)→ 1 when
h2 → 0 (hence, h1 = 1 − h2 → 1). Consider x2 and h2 as parameters, with φ(x2, h2)
the value function of the optimization problem where the indemnity is canceled when
x > x2. Note that φ(1, h2) and φ(xˆ2(h2), h2) correspond to the expected utility at
equilibrium when there is no audit and under the negligence rule, respectively. Observe
that ∆ is a function of x2, with ∆
′(x2) = [pi1gˆ1(x2)− pi2gˆ2(x2)]/(pi2− pi1). Let λ be the
Lagrange multiplier associated with K2(u0, v) ≤ W¯ . The envelop theorem yields
lim
x2→1
∂φ(x2, h2)
∂x2
=
∑
i
hipiigˆi(x2)(v − λI) + v∆′(x2)
(
1−
∑
i
hipii
)(
λ
u′(u−1(uˆ))
− 1
)
.
Furthermore, the first-order condition w.r.t. u0 shows that
lim
x2→1
λ =
1
1−∑i=1,2 hipii
u′(u−1(uˆ))
+
∑
i=1,2 hipii
u′(u−1(u0))
> u′(u−1(uˆ)).
since u0 < uˆ. We deduce that
∂φ(x2, h2)
∂x2
< v
[∑
i
hipiigˆi(x2) + ∆
′(x2)
(
1−
∑
i
hipii
)(
λ
u′(u−1(uˆ))
− 1
)]
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when x2 is close to 1. When h2 and x2 are close to 0 and 1 respectively, we have
∂φ(x2, h2)
∂x2
< v
[
pi1gˆ1(x2) +
pi1gˆ1(x2)− pi2gˆ2(x2)
pi1 − pi2 (1− pi1)
(
λ
u′(u−1(uˆ))
− 1
)]
=
vpi1gˆ1(x2)
pi1 − pi2
[
pi1 − pi2 +
(
1− pi2gˆ2(x2)
pi1gˆ1(x2)
)
(1− pi1)
(
λ
u′(u−1(uˆ))
− 1
)]
< 0,
since gˆ2(x2)/gˆ1(x2) → +∞ when x2 → 1. Since xˆ2(h2) < 1 and xˆ2(h2) → 1 when
h2 → 0, we deduce φ(xˆ2(h2), h2) > φ(1, h2) when h2 is close to 0, i.e. h2 < h?? ∈ (0, 1).
H Monotonicity of ∆2(x)/∆1(x)
Considering (23) as a system of equations with unknowns v and v¯ yields
v =
(A1 − z)∆2(x3)− (A2 − z)∆1(x3)
∆1(x2)∆2(x3)−∆1(x3)∆2(x2) , v¯ =
(A2 − z)∆1(x2)− (A1 − z)∆2(x2)
∆1(x2)∆2(x3)−∆1(x3)∆2(x2) (47)
with z = 0 when I = L. We have to verify that the expressions given by (47) are
positive, i.e. that we have
∆2(x3)/∆1(x3) > (A2 − z)/(A1 − z) > ∆2(x2)/∆1(x2). (48)
The condition ∆2(x3)/∆1(x3) > ∆2(x2)/∆1(x2) can be rewritten as∫ x3
x2
(
d ln ∆2(x)
dx
− d ln ∆1(x)
dx
)
dx > 0,
which is satisfied if
d ln ∆2(x)
dx
>
d ln ∆1(x)
dx
(49)
for all x ∈ [0, 1]. Denote βi(x) ≡ pii+1[1 − Gˆi+1(x)] − pii[1 − Gˆi(x)]. We have ∆i(x) =
βi(x)/βi(0) and
d ln ∆i(x)
dx
=
∆′i(x)
∆i(x)
=
piigˆi(x)− pii+1gˆi+1(x)
pii+1[1− Gˆi+1(x)]− pii[1− Gˆi(x)]
=
β′i(x)
βi(x)
(50)
≡ −γi(x)
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As βi(0) = pii+1 − pii, we get
βi(x) = (pii+1 − pii) exp
{
−
∫ x
0
γi(t)dt
}
.
Moreover, as βi(1) = 0, we must have
lim
x→1
∫ x
0
γi(t)dt = +∞. (51)
Condition (49) is thus given by
γ2(x) < γ1(x), (52)
for all x ∈ [0, 1]. Denote
ξi(x) = pii[1− Gˆi(x)],
for i = 1, 2, 3. Given pi1 and Gˆ1, as βi(x) = ξi+1(x)−ξi(x), we have ξ2(x) = ξ1(x)+β1(x)
and ξ3(x) = ξ2(x) + β2(x). Given pi2 and pi3, we can deduce Gˆ2 and Gˆ3. Also, using
(50) and limx→0 ∆i(x) = 2, we have
∆i(x) = 2 exp
{
−
∫ x
0
γi(t)dt
}
,
and thus ∆2(x) > ∆1(x) for all x ∈ (0, 1) under (52) and ∆′i(x) = −γi(x)∆i(x) < 0 if
γi(x) > 0 for all x. These probability distribution must satisfy MLRP, which can be
checked on specific examples.
Example: Consider γi(x) = ai/(1−x), ai > 0 to satisfy condition (51), and suppose
Gˆ1 is uniform, i.e. gˆ1(x) = 1 for all x. We have ξ
′
i+1(x)/ξ
′
i(x) = pii+1gˆi+1(x)/piigˆi(x) and
thus MLRP is satisfied if ξ′i+1(x)/ξ
′
i(x) is increasing. We have
ξ′2(x)
ξ′1(x)
=
ξ′1(x) + β
′
1(x)
ξ′1(x)
= 1− β
′
1(x)
pi1
,
since ξ1(x) = pi1(1− x). Using β′1(x) = −γ1(x)β1(x), we get
ξ′2(x)
ξ′1(x)
= 1 + γ1(x)β1(x)/pi1.
MLRP implies that γ1(x)β1(x) is increasing, hence γ
′
1(x)− γ21(x) = a1(1− a1)/(1−
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x)2 > 0 for all x, i.e. a1 < 1. We also have
ξ′3(x)
ξ′2(x)
=
ξ′2(x) + β
′
2(x)
ξ′2(x)
= 1 +
β′2(x)
ξ′1(x) + β
′
1(x)
= 1 +
γ2(x)β2(x)
pi1 + γ1(x)β1(x)
,
which is increasing if
0 < [γ′2(x)β2(x) + γ2(x)β
′
2(x)][pi1 + γ1(x)β1(x)]− [γ′1(x)β1(x) + γ1(x)β′1(x)]γ2(x)β2(x)
= a2(1− a2)pi1β2(x)/(1− x)2 + (a1 − a2)a1a2β1(x)β2(x)/(1− x)3,
where the first term is positive if a2 < 1, and the second if a1 > a2. MLRP is thus sat-
isfied if 1 > a1 > a2 > 0. As a consequence, we have ∆2(x3)/∆2(x2) > ∆1(x3)/∆1(x2)
and ∆2(x) > ∆1(x) for all x ∈ (0, 1).
I Proof of Proposition 6
We have
z = u(w − P )− u(w − P − L+ I) ≤ (L− I)u′(w − P − L+ I),
since u′′ < 0 and I ≤ L. Moreover, with v ≥ 0 and v¯ ≥ 0 (and c = 0) we have P ≤ p¯iI
where p¯i =
∑3
i=1 hipii, implying u
′(w−P −L+I) < u′(w−L+(1− p¯i)I). Consequently,
0 ≤ z ≤ (L− I)u′(w − L+ (1− p¯i)I),
where the right hand term decreases with I. We thus have
0 ≤ z ≤ Lu′(w − L) ≡ zˆ.
Assume that zˆ < inf{A1, A2}. If A2 > A1, the ratio (A2 − z)/(A1 − z) increases with
z ∈ [0, zˆ] and (48) is satisfied whatever the optimal value of z if
∆2(x3)
∆1(x3)
>
A2 − zˆ
A1 − zˆ and
∆2(x2)
∆1(x2)
<
A2
A1
.
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These conditions hold if A1 and A2 satisfy
∆2(x3)
∆1(x3)
>
A2
A1
>
∆2(x2)
∆1(x2)
, (53)
and zˆ is small enough. If A2 < A1, the ratio (A2− z)/(A1− z) decreases with z ∈ [0, zˆ]
and (48) is satisfied whatever the optimal value of z if
∆2(x3)
∆1(x3)
>
A2
A1
and
∆2(x2)
∆1(x2)
<
A2 − zˆ
A1 − zˆ ,
hence if A1 and A2 satisfy (53) and zˆ is small enough. In the example, we have
∆2(x)/∆1(x) = 1/(1−x)a1−a2 with a1 > a2 and thus limx→1 ∆2(x)/∆1(x) = +∞ while
we have limx→0 ∆2(x)/∆1(x) = 1.
J Proof of proposition 7
In the fourth-best case, an allocation a is defined by a contract (P, I), an audit strategy
q(·) with threshold s?, insurance law rules {yb, b ∈ B}, a behavioral rule b?(·) and a
(potential) allegation function bˆ(·). The indemnity reduction function z(x) is defined
by (28) or (30) instead of (11). Let aI be the optimal allocation when the burden
of proof is given to the insurer, with verification cost kI . It satisfies (6)-(10), (12),
(14)-(16), and (30)-(32). As z(x) = 0 for x < x˜ = inf{x ∈ (0, 1] : ybˆ(x) ≥ kI}, we may
assume ybˆ(x) = 0 if x < x˜ w.l.g.
Let AP be the set of feasible allocations when the burden of proof is given to the
policyholder, with cost of verifiable information kP . An allocation a belongs to AP
if it satisfies (6)-(10), (12), (14)-(16), and (27)-(29). Consider first the case where
kP = kI . We have x
? = inf{x ∈ (0, 1] : ybˆ(x) ≥ kP} = x˜, the indemnity reduction
functions (28) and (30) are the same, and since aI satisfies (32), it also satisfies (29)
strictly. Hence aI ∈ AP . However, since (29) is satisfied but not binding, aI is not
the optimal allocation when the burden of proof is given to the policyholder, i.e. there
exists a ∈ AP that leads to a policyholder’s expected utility higher than with aI . Since
the optimal expected utility is non-increasing w.r.t. kP when the policyholder has the
burden of proof, the same conclusion holds when kP < kI , and it remains true if kP−kI
is positive but not too large.
55
